Journeys on North Pole
Over the past year or two, and for the first time since the Cold War, the American defense establishment has begun to appreciate the Arctic’s significance. Noticing a problem,...
Published on: 15/05/2021
Over the past year or two, and for the first time since the Cold War, the American defense establishment has begun to appreciate the Arctic’s significance. Noticing a problem, however, is not the same as solving it. Though the United States is an Arctic nation, it has been noticeably absent from the region as a leader ( for the past few decades, at least). This American absenteeism stands in stark contrast to the United States’ involvement in other regions, even where it does not hold territory.
The United States showed slightly more interest during 2019, when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attended the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting, issued “stern warnings” to Russia and China, and called Canadian claims in the Northwest Passage “illegitimate.” The key disagreement between the American delegation and others at the meeting relates to views on climate change. Pompeo’s clumsy remarks revealed an American interest in being more proactive in the Arctic without a thorough understanding of the region’s needs and standards.
The Trump administration has released two Arctic defence strategies, one dated 2016 (but released in 2017) and the second in early 2019. The December 2016 strategy was notable for what it did not say: it promised no additional resources nor high prioritization for Arctic issues. Instead, the strategy discussed working with partners and allies to mitigate gaps where Washington is not prioritizing Arctic issues. In 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense published a new Arctic strategy after Congress required an update to the 2016 version. The 2019 strategy also places a stronger emphasis on deterrence and great power competition, but still lacks any commitment to resourcing, except that it specifically commits to not trying to keep pace with Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic. The strategy does commit to much-needed enhanced surveillance and monitoring efforts. The strategy also cites cold weather training – an improvement to tactical readiness and proficiency, but hardly a strategic objective – as a potential benefit of participation in Arctic exercises.
The Defense Department strategy and service leadership speaking on Arctic issues all emphasize roughly similar points:
1. The warming Arctic is bringing more commercial activity;
2. Russia is building up forces but so far, they are behaving defensively;
3. China’s investment presence and growing interest in the Arctic is concerning;
4. And The United States relies on allies and partners in the region to help address all three of the above issues.
These points are all valid. However, the United States has never satisfied itself with relying completely upon partners and allies in great power competition.
Some of the American resource deficits are more important than others. The Department of Defense is rightly focused on surveillance and monitoring. The dirty little secret of the Arctic is that we do not really know what is happening up there. Canada only recently launched satellites and expanded the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone to enable the possibility of surveilling of the entire country.
Even so, Canada’s new Arctic Policy Framework does not commit to funding full surveillance of the North American Arctic. Thus far, there has been little to no realignment at a strategic level. U.S. Northern Command and U.S. European Command (and arguably, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) each have responsibility for part of the Arctic. Despite being required by the 2016 strategy to resolve potential gaps, it does not appear that a specific realignment or gap assessment has occurred. The services instead have been taking the lead.
The most well-known U.S. military investment in the Arctic is the rotational presence of two marine corps companies in Norway, which began in 2017. Though they are technically stationed below the Arctic, their proximity to the Norwegian-Russian border makes their presence strategically noteworthy.
Russia is displeased with the marine corps’ presence, calling it an “attack” and a Norwegian betrayal of a long-standing promise not to permanently station foreign troops on their soil. The ability to pique Russian ire demonstrates the outsized geopolitical impact these 700 marines have been able to garner, merely through their presence.
Gen. Robert Neller, the recently retired commandant of the marine corps, made sparse comments about the rotational presence, but his few remarks focused on the value of cold-weather training. If cold-weather training were the ultimate goal, the marine corps could remain within the United States and not trigger the geopolitical ramifications and logistical headache of rotating marines through a foreign country. Two major results of this rotational presence – reassuring NATO and the Norwegians that the marine corps is investing in their security and disrupting Russia’s sense of security in the region – are the noteworthy strategic benefits of the rotational presence.
For most Americans, the Arctic has long been out of sight and out of mind. Yet analysts believe that one-quarter of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves may be found in the Arctic—untapped petroleum and mineral resources that could approach $35 trillion in value. Four of the world’s 10 major fisheries also are located in the Arctic. And experts are concerned that the melting Arctic icecap will create significant environmental concerns and impact the maritime interests of many nations—including the United States.
Russia, on the other hand, has long seen the region as vital to its economic and strategic interests. After all, 20 percent of Russia’s exports and 10 percent of its GDP come from the Arctic. Half of the Arctic coastline is Russian territory, as is half of the region’s population.
Since oil and gas are responsible for roughly 60 percent of Russia’s export revenues and 30 percent of its national budget at a time when the Russian economy is struggling, it would be a surprise if President Putin weren’t eyeing the region as medicine for his country’s economic woes. And as if to put an exclamation mark on this mission to lock in Russia’s Arctic economic interests, Putin announced $300 billion in new oil and gas incentives there last year.
Moscow is also building up its military assets in Arctic (Сибири)—both conventional and nuclear. Russia has announced plans for a new fleet of ships explicitly dedicated to the Arctic region, including more than a dozen icebreakers. Russia is currently the only country in the world building nuclear-powered icebreakers.
In March 2021, Putin boasted of the prowess of his military leaders in executing an exercise in which three nuclear submarines broke through the ice as Russian fighters flew simultaneously over the North Pole. Russia has placed numerous bombers, fighters, and radar systems in the Arctic, and Western media has reported accounts of Russian forces jamming GPS signals for air traffic off the Norwegian coast and targeting NATO assets with simulated weapon use.
In 1935, Gen. Billy Mitchell testified before Congress that “Alaska is the most strategic place on Earth.” An updated version of that statement would say the entire Arctic region is now that place—for economic and environmental reasons, as well as national security
