



International
Labour
Office

Forced labour, human trafficking, and slavery in Africa

Current responses and a way forward

A background paper for a regional conference to be held on 19-20 Nov. 2013, in Lusaka, Zambia

SAP-FL (Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour)

IPEC-TACKLE Project (International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour – Tackling Child Labour through Education)



LIST OF ACCRONYMS

APRD – Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et de la Démocratie
AU.COMMIT – African Union Commission Initiative against Trafficking
AUDSA – African Union Department of Social Affairs
CAR – Central African Republic
CEACR – Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
CEDAW – Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CPJP – Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix
CRC – Convention (or Committee) on the Rights of the Child
CSC – Confederation of Trade Unions of Congo
CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
DWCP – The Decent Work Country Programme
ECOWAS – Economic Community Of West African States
ETI – Ethical Trade Initiative
FARDC – Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDPC – Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain
FL – Forced Labour
HRW – Human Rights Watch
ICI – International Cocoa Initiative
IGA – Income Generating Activities
IPEC – International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour
ILO – International Labour Organisation
IO – International Organisation
IOM – International Organisation for Migration
ISIM – Institute for the Study of International Migration
ITUC – The International Trades Unions Confederation
LRA – Lord’s Resistance Army
LUTRENA – The Programme to Combat the Trafficking of Children for Labour Exploitation in West and Central Africa
LVC – Local Vigilance Committee
MLJC – Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice
MLSS – Ministry of Labour and Social Security
NAPTIP – (The Nigerian) National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
NSP – (The Eritrean) National Service Programme
Palermo Protocol – The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the Convention on Trans-national Organised Crime
SACTAP – The IOM’s Southern African Counter-Trafficking Assistance Programme
SADC – Southern African Development Community
SAP-FL – Special Action Programme on Forced Labour
TDH – Terre des Hommes
THB – Trafficking in Human Beings/ Human Trafficking

UFDR – Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement
UNAMID – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
UNICRI – United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNOCHR – United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRISD – United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USGAO – United States Government Accountability Office
USTIP – United States Trafficking in Persons (Office or Report)
VC – Village Committee(s)
WYDC – (The Eritrean) Warsai-Yikaalo Development Campaign

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Two centuries after the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, the ILO estimates that at least 20.9 million people – of whom 3.7 million in Africa – continue to work under extreme coercion, largely in the informal and illegal economy. In terms of prevalence, it is suggested that four in every 1000 Africans may find themselves in situations of forced labour at any given time. From the evidence that exists, the means and modalities of this exploitation can vary – from state- and militia- imposed work in Eritrea or Sudan, to the vestiges of slavery in the Sahel, the plight of trafficked Ethiopian domestic workers in the Middle East, or in global supply chains linked to Zambia or the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Though sufficient clear data and detailed empirical research are lacking, what is apparent is that coercion and exploitation remain a fundamental part of global economic life. Five years into an economic crisis that threatens the well-being of citizens across the world, including on the African continent, there is a real danger of this situation worsening. It is in this context that the ILO's Special Action Programme on Forced Labour (SAP-FL) and its International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) seek to assess the state of knowledge on forced labour (FL), human trafficking (THB) and slavery in Africa, as a background to the Lusaka conference that will examine best practices and suggest a way forward in the continent's fight against them.

This report brings together an overview of what we currently do and do not know about coercive labour in Africa, what is and is not happening in response, and what we might do in order to take the battle forward. The report begins, in Chapter 1, with a discussion of its methodology and an explanation of key terms used. In Chapter 2, the report reviews current knowledge on FL, THB and slavery-like practices, pointing also to the many significant gaps in research and understanding around these issues. Chapter 3 focuses in detail on governmental, civil society and business initiatives to prevent or protect, and it offers a critical discussion of where these efforts fall short. In Chapter 4, the report concludes with suggestions as to where we can go from here.

CHAPTER 1

DEFINITIONS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS

Methodology

The main goal of this report is to assess the contemporary state of knowledge regarding FL, THB and slavery in Africa, as well as to examine efforts to eradicate them. As such, the major methodological approach was qualitative, involving an intensive literature search, review, and synthesis of relevant documents concerning these issues and the policies related to them.

Documents were obtained from a wide array of sources. Notably, the ILO's catalogue of existing research and its databases on forced labour and legal frameworks were important. Additionally, secondary sources were gathered from international organisations, NGOs and governments active in this field. Uniquely, the report also draws on a significant body of academic research, both primary and secondary. This included research conducted by the author himself, during a doctorate and post-doctorate which examine the issues in question.

Finally, the report also draws on a large body of interview material from interviews conducted for this report and for related research, with officials and academics who have experience studying or working against FL, THB and slavery. Interviewees were purposively sampled in light of their experience.

A draft report was first prepared and discussed with a group of expert practitioners at the ILO's headquarters in Geneva. This draft was subsequently revised to reflect the results of that consultation as well as the continual feedback the author received from a range of other reviewers.

Definitions

Slavery, servitude and slavery-like practices are defined and outlawed by a number of international instruments. The first, and still most important, is the *Slavery Convention*, adopted in Geneva in 1926. In Article 1 of this convention, slavery is defined as follows:

'(a) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.

(b) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves'.

In Article 2, the High Contracting Parties agree to undertake:

'(a) To prevent and suppress the slave trade;

(b) To bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms’.

In 1956, the *Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery* extended the definition of slavery established under the 1926 Convention, drawing on the language of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)*, to include institutions and practices deemed ‘analogous to slavery’. According to Article 1, these include:

‘(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined;

(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status;

(c) Any institution or practice whereby:

- (i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or*
- (ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or*
- (iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person;*

(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour’.

Human Trafficking has a similarly rich conceptual and definitional history. The first global instrument to address it was the early Twentieth Century *International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Trade*, which ‘aimed to combat the compulsive and abusive procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad’. In 1910, the reach of this Agreement was expanded to also cover ‘domestic trafficking’, while further definitional additions were secured in 1921, 1933 and 1941.

In the year 2000, after an increase in civil society and governmental attention to the issue of forced and exploitative migration, the UN adopted the *Protocol to*

Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the Convention on Trans-national Organised Crime, (otherwise known as the ‘Palermo’ or ‘Trafficking Protocol’), which came into operation as international law in 2003. This document now represents the current internationally agreed definition of THB, having been ratified by 157 countries (UNODC 2012). Article 3 holds that:

‘(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age’.

While the Protocol requires that states take ‘measures such as research, information and mass media campaigns and social and economic initiatives (Article 9(2))’, as well as those that will alleviate vulnerability-inducing ‘cause-factors’ such as poverty and lack of equal opportunity (Article 9(4)), no protection for victims or potential victims is considered mandatory.

It is also important to note, as does the ILO’s 2009 *Cost of Coercion* report (p.7), that according to the Palermo Protocol, THB comprises multiple definitional facets. Indeed, it consists of ‘three basic elements: first, the *action* (of recruitment, etc.); second, the *means* (of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, etc.); and, third, the *purpose* of exploitation’. The event requires all elements to be present in order to be classed as THB.

With regards to *Forced Labour*, the flagship global definitional instrument is the ILO’s *Forced Labour Convention* of 1930 (No. 29). In Article 2(1), ‘forced or compulsory labour’ is defined as follows:

‘All work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’.

As this convention was originally intended primarily to encourage states to refrain from using the forced labour of either their citizens or those under their control, it contains a long list of exceptions to the definition, which include military service, civic obligations or work in cases of emergency. This context is also reflected in the fact that the convention encourages states to abolish forced labour ‘in the shortest time possible’, rather than immediately.

Subsequent developments in the international legal regime around FL included the ILO’s 1957 *Abolition of Forced Convention* (No. 105), which further specified that FL can never be used as a means of political coercion or education, as punishment for expressing political views or for participating in strike action, as a tool of labour discipline, or of racial, social, national or religious discrimination. Crucially, as was noted in the 2007 *General Survey* submitted to the International Labour Conference, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has made clear that the 1957 convention ends any transitional period to which the 1926 convention may have referred.

Though these conventions placed an early emphasis on FL extracted by the state, they were also designed to prevent FL by private citizens, and it is now widely recognized that most coercive labour takes place in the private economy. In this context, it is important to recognise, as does the ILO’s *General Survey* and its *Estimate of Forced Labour*, that the definition of FL contains three key elements (p.19):

‘First, some form of work or service must be provided by the individual concerned to a third party; second, the work is performed under the threat of a penalty, which can take various forms, whether physical, psychological, financial or other; and third, the work is undertaken involuntarily, meaning that the person either became engaged in the activity against their free will or, once engaged, finds that he or she cannot leave the job with a reasonable period of notice, and without forgoing payment or other entitlements’.

Forced labour is thus not defined by the nature of the work being performed (which can be either legal or illegal under national law), but rather by the nature of the relationship between the person performing the work and the person exacting it.

Although this report focuses on what are three nominally different practices – FL, THB and slavery – it is crucial to realise that there are very real overlaps between each of these, at both the practical and the conceptual level. Indeed, the ILO have argued in the *General Survey* that FL includes practices such as slavery, practices similar to slavery, debt bondage and serfdom, while the definition of FL ‘has been interpreted by the CEACR to encompass trafficking in persons for the purpose of exploitation, as defined by the Palermo Protocol’ (ILO 2012:19-20; see also ILO 2013, para. 35-7). Thus, whilst definitional differences do exist – for instance, organ trafficking constitutes neither forced labour nor slavery – and while, as Dottridge has argued, it is ‘probably a hopeless task [to search for] all-

encompassing definitions and criteria which can be applied to measure whether any specific case is “abusive exploitation” (2005:691), the links between these three forms of exploitation remain significant. As such, over the rest of this report, all will be treated to a certain degree as interchangeable and thus identifiable using the same overarching term – FL – with each representing slightly different points at the ‘unfree end’ of the labour spectrum (Lerche 2007).

Definitional Problems and Debates

Though the world clearly possesses a well-established and carefully elaborated definitional matrix covering the abuses examined in this report, this definitional matrix still remains the subject of intense debate, contestation and challenge (ILO 2009:8). In fact, as the world’s economy becomes ever more integrated, these definitional debates are becoming ever more serious and widespread. In this section, we will therefore examine some of the most significant. It is important to note at the outset that this is not merely an academic exercise, nor are these debates simply ‘intellectual’. *How we define the world determines how we act in it.* In this sense, what constitutes ‘coercion’, ‘consent’ or even ‘forced labour’ is *actually a question of who gets legal protection, in what form, under which circumstances, and from which authorities.* This is, therefore, an inherently political question (UNODC 2012a), and since definitions are never fixed or unchanging, but are always the result of ongoing discussion, negotiation and campaigning, it is one we must continue to reflect on.

Consent, Coercion and the Position of Vulnerability

The concept of ‘exploitation’ remains fundamental to understanding the kinds of abusive labour practices under examination in this report. Yet it is well-known that there exists no single, globally-agreed-on definition for what exactly exploitation *is*, or for where one draws the line between ‘legitimate’ and illegitimate/exploitative labour (ILO 2009:8)¹. In the absence of a clear definition, the dividing line between exploitative and un-exploitative labour is commonly taken to reside at the point where consent becomes coercion, and where labour is no longer ‘freely’ given. Here too, however, there is a lack of clarity, since most

¹ This fact is widely lamented. As one retired forced labour expert described it as ‘*the Pandora’s Box issue in our field*’. It is largely the result of political-ideological divisions over how one determines ‘fair’ wages, over what kinds of work are seen philosophically as acceptable, and over what structure a market economy should take. On the left of the political spectrum, there are those for whom all wage-labour constitutes a form of exploitation, since all wage-labour involves the appropriation by an employer of the value added by an employee to a product sold on the market. In this understanding, ‘exploitation’ retains its basic double meaning – as the use of an input (in this case a worker) for the creation of an output, and as the *unfair* use of an individual by another for that person’s personal gain. In many respects, the ILO has built on and incorporated aspects of this tradition, holding as one of its foundational principles that ‘*labour is not a commodity*’.

Those who come from the dominant liberal, as well as politically conservative, traditions, take a different view. In their analysis, wage-labour is not in itself exploitative. Rather, wage-labour is nothing more than the free exchange of a worker’s labour-power for ‘fair’ wages (determined by the implicitly fair ‘magic hand of the market’, in the form of its trade-off between labour supply and demand), with the supposedly greater financial risk undertaken, entrepreneurial spirit shown, and value added by an employer justifying his greater share of post-sale profits.

These debates are further complicated by those around which kinds of labour are seen, philosophically, to be acceptable, and thus as subject to being experienced as either fair or exploitative. Those divisions are perhaps best illustrated by the case of sex work. On the one hand, ‘abolitionist feminists’ argue vehemently that sex is a special category of human activity that must never be commodified by being subject to economic exchange. In their understanding, there is something unique about sex, such that a fundamental, *essential* difference exists between it and the work performed when building a house. Many other feminists disagree, however, arguing that sex work must be understood as any other kind of human labour, and thus as either potentially fair or potentially exploitative.

labour theorists and the ILO agree that there can be no absolute binary between free and forced labour (ILO 2009:8-9); rather, they accept the existence of a continuum 'from more-or-less free labour relations, to fully unfree relations; i.e. degrees of unfreedom, and/or of inequality underlying the labour relations' (Lerche 2007:443)

Though this definitional fluidity represents an understandable response to the messiness of real-world situations, its major problem is that it is not paralleled with regards to the essential political and practical questions of *who or what can be guilty of coercion, of how that coercion can be manifest, and thus of what responsibility authorities have to protect against it*. The ILO's 2007 *General Survey*, for instance, asserts that:

'An external constraint or indirect coercion interfering with a worker's freedom to "offer himself voluntarily" may result not only from an act of the authorities, such as a statutory instrument, but also from an employer's practice...However, the employer or the State are not accountable for all external constraints or indirect coercion existing in practice: for example, the need to work in order to earn one's living could become relevant only in conjunction with other factors for which they are answerable' (2007:20-1).

On this understanding, coercion and unfreedom exist legally only as *direct* and *individualised* phenomena, perpetrated by an individual employer or by the state. This discounts the generalised 'need to earn one's living', as if somehow 'economic compulsion' were a natural state of affairs absent any 'act of the authorities'. As is frequently argued, however, including by many African critics, this remains entirely contradictory, since it fails to take account of the very political fact that economic compulsion is itself always *precisely the result of acts of the authorities*. As the legal scholar, Professor Robert Steinfield, explains:

'Economic compulsion is an artefact of law, not of nature. [Although] market forces are supposed...to operate impersonally and indirectly...to exert pressure only in the way that nature exerts pressure (if you do not work you starve)...economic coercion always has its source in a set of legal rights, privileges, and powers that place one person in a position to force another person to choose between labor and some more disagreeable alternative' (1991:19-20).

Robert Lee Hale put this point starkly when arguing on behalf of the American poor in 1923:

'[The worker] must eat. Yet while there is no law against eating in the abstract, there is a law which forbids him to eat any of the food which actually exists in the community – and that is the law of private property...Unless the non-owner [of property] can produce his own food, the law compels him to starve if he has not wages, and compels

*him to go without wages unless he obeys the behests of some employer*²
(in Steinfeld 1991:20).

To place this observation in contemporary African terms, what it implies is that, when a poor African woman faces the choice between starvation or bonded labour, her ‘choice’ to opt for bonded labour represents no real choice at all, but rather the non-choice of a lesser evil that has been forced upon her by the structure of prevailing national and international legal regimes, which legally sanction her lack of entitlement to land, financial support, childcare, food or other necessary social protection. *It is therefore indirectly the responsibility of clearly identifiable actors making real-world decisions.* Seen in this way, debate over how one defines ‘consent’ or ‘coercion’ is less an indulgent philosophical exercise and more an imperative moral, political and practical negotiation over which kinds of coercive pressures are considered legitimate and illegitimate in labour relations (ibid.16; see also Steinfeld 2001), and thus over which kinds of social protections national and international authorities have a duty to provide. It is not simply that ‘labour rights are human rights’ (Alston 2005), it is also that socio-economic rights underpin the kinds of labour conditions that human beings will have to accept, *and consequently the kinds of human rights that they can expect to enjoy.*

This is increasingly being recognised by those involved in anti-FL work and has been reflected in discussions around the legal concept of ‘the abuse of a position of vulnerability’, included in the Palermo Protocol as one of the ‘means’ by which trafficking can take place. For many years, ‘the abuse of a position of vulnerability’ remained an abstract and un-defined concept, with anti-trafficking or anti-FL actors unsure of how to operationalise it. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have recently responded with an Issue Paper examining the question. The paper acknowledges that ‘vulnerability’ is a fluid term denoting an individual’s susceptibility to exploitation, and it underlines that *that susceptibility is conditioned by factors which are both legal and non-legal in character*³. Crucially, the paper highlights that abusing a ‘position of vulnerability’ means taking economic advantage of ‘any situation in which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved’. Implicitly, therefore, it acknowledges the role that governments play in creating the conditions under which workers have an alternative to the exploitative working relations to which they have to submit when the unscrupulous are prepared to take advantage of their penury (2012a).

² It is for precisely this reason that Professor Jairus Banaji asks:

‘When is a contract “voluntary”? The answer is, probably never. The underlying assumption in the claim that some or most contracts are “voluntary” is that we can “descriptively identify domains of freedom and distinguish them from domains of choicelessness”... [But] it is possible to argue that no contract is free because economic coercion is pervasive under capitalism’ (Banaji 2003:69-72).

³ They include (2012a:20): ‘age (youth and, to a lesser extent, old age); irregular legal / migration status (including threats to disclose information about irregular / legal migration status to authorities); poverty; precarious social status; pregnancy; illness and disability (mental and physical); gender (typically being female, but also transgender); sexuality, religious and cultural beliefs (notably practices commonly referred to as juju and voodoo); linguistic isolation; lack of social networks; dependency (on employer, family member, etc); threats to disclose information about the victim to his or her family or others; and abuse of emotional / romantic relationship’

Forced Labour of Children

The question of coercion and consent is also subject to significant debate when it comes to child labour. Though ‘there is no specific definition of what constitutes forced labour of children’ (ILO-IPEC and ILO-SAP-FL, 2012:16), in the ILO’s *Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour*, forced child labour is operationally defined as ‘work performed by children under coercion applied by a third party (other than by his or her parents) either to the child or to the child’s parents, or work performed by a child as a direct consequence of their parent or parents being engaged in forced labour’ (ibid.17). This definition recognises that a child’s dependence on its parents can lead the child to become a victim of FL when the parents are themselves already victims. *It also recognises the centrality of coercion or ‘involuntariness’ when distinguishing ‘forced child labour’ from simple child labour.*

This distinction is important, since not all child labour involves force or coercion. The two instruments defining child labour are the 1973 *Minimum Age Convention* (No. 138) and the 1999 *Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention* (No. 182), which identify child labour as all work performed by anyone under the age of school completion – usually 14 – as well as all work performed which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is deemed to be detrimental to the child⁴. Child labour is thus defined separately from forced labour and the presence of coercion or force is crucial to that separation – as is attested by the category of the ‘Worst Forms of Child Labour’, which include extremes such as forced or compulsory labour, slavery or practices similar to slavery, the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage or serfdom.

Conflict and debate arises around these definitions, however, because the notion of “offering oneself voluntarily” must be interpreted in light of the fact that, in legal terms, a child below the age of legal majority cannot him or herself give consent to work’ (ibid.), and certainly cannot give consent to work that has been deemed by authorities other than him or herself to be exploitative⁵. As such, in legal, even child labour which is not forced labour and does not involve coercion *is treated as de jure forced*, and even in circumstances where the child has meaningfully offered their consent. This has, as we shall see in the following chapter, led to policing efforts that treat certain kinds of child labour as if it were forced labour.

Many of the world’s leading child rights experts argue that this is problematic. Professors Bourdillon, Levinson, Myers and White, for example, are paradigmatic in their suggestion that law and policy should build on the requirement established in Article 12 of the *UN Convention on the Rights of the Child* (CRC) that young people capable of forming and expressing their views should have those views taken into account, *including* with regards to the work that they do (2011). They argue that although some work should always and everywhere be deemed illegal (for adults as well as for children), adolescents who are sufficiently mature and

⁴ See also the Report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the Status of the Rights of the Child, A/64/172, dated July 27 2009. Paragraph 7, in particular.

⁵ See, for instance, Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol.

responsible should be given the right to decide whether or not they engage in work that is understood by officials as exploitative, since it is they, rather than those distant officials or the similarly distant drafters of international conventions, who are best placed to decide on whether it is in their best interests. In other words, their work should not be understood or policed as *du jure forced*. This is said to be particularly relevant in the African context, where people face particular economic hardship, and where young people often reach social adulthood at an earlier age than in many other parts of the world and so are required and expected to contribute economically sooner than their non-African peers. Is it appropriate, many ask, in contexts such as this, for law-makers in rich countries or capital cities to tell poor, but socially mature, teenagers that they should not be allowed to take relatively well-paid jobs that will improve their lives simply because doing so would constitute the offensive category of ‘child labour’? Is policing youth work as if it were ‘forced labour’ not a case of tackling the weak (who must accept poor jobs) without standing up to the strong (who create the conditions under which those jobs are the only option)?

In order to illustrate the practical relevance of these questions, Bourdillon et al. draw on extensive fieldwork carried out with adolescent textile workers in Morocco. Towards the end of 1995, they explain, the British retail chain, Marks and Spencer, visited a Moroccan supplier factory to demand that all child workers be summarily dismissed, in order that the company be able to comply with international law. This happened, and although the many teenage girls previously employed by the factory had admitted to sometimes feeling exploited at work, all subsequently claimed that their lives post-dismissal were poorer and harder, and that at most what they had needed was the employer to improve their wages and working conditions. One girl, Amal, described crying ‘for two weeks’ when she was dismissed. ‘For Amal and her friends, dismissal meant a reduction in family incomes. The employer, not the children, was responsible for violating the regulations on working conditions for apprentices, but it was the children, not the employer, who suffered the consequences of dismissal’ (ibid.1-5).

CHAPTER 2

WHAT WE KNOW, AND WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW


‘Given the elusive nature of the target population and the limited direct measurement of the phenomenon, it would be unrealistic to expect global estimation of forced labour with a high degree of accuracy’.

ILO, Global Estimate of Forced Labour, 2012

Having established the existing definitions and addressed the prevailing definitional debates, this chapter will offer an overview of the current state of knowledge around what are understood as FL, THB and slavery in Africa. As per the *Global Estimate*, the chapter will often use the term ‘FL’ to cover all three. It will begin with a brief discussion of magnitude and general trends. The chapter will then examine certain examples in further detail, drawing on empirical evidence from different countries and different economic sectors. The overall message that the chapter will present is that while authoritative estimates have been made, and despite the existence of some good quality data, our understanding in this area is still in need of strengthening.


Overview of Current Knowledge

The ILO’s *Global Estimate of Forced Labour*, which includes cases that could be considered slavery or THB, suggests that as many as 3.7million Africans may live in situations of forced labour today:



Source: ILO, Estimate of Forced Labour, 2012, p14

This figure places Africa as the second of the world’s regions in terms of FL prevalence:



Source: ILO, Estimate of Forced Labour, 2012, p15

As with the rest of the world, it is believed that most of this FL takes place in the private economy. Indeed, 90% of FL is extracted by individuals or enterprises, as compared to only 10% by political authorities. One in five victims are believed to be exploited for their sexual labour, and women and girls are said to make up 55% of victims. Under-18s represent a quarter of FL victims, and in recent decades there has been an enormous increase in attention to apparent ‘child victims of trafficking’. More generally, migrants account for a little over 40% of all FL victims. In total, billions of dollars are said to be lost both to the world and the continental economy, as wages due to coerced labourers go unpaid (ILO 2009).

In terms of causality, it is commonly asserted that ‘poverty and tradition’ are the major causes of FL in Africa, with unscrupulous employers and weak state capacity or regulatory failure also cited as significant. This analysis dovetails with academically established theories of crime, including that of Cohen and Felson, who see crime as the result of three combining factors: a suitable target, a motivated offender, and the lack of a capable guardian (in Andrees and Besler, 2009)⁶.

In the case of African FL, the ‘suitable target’ is constituted by the large supply of workers who are poor and vulnerable enough to be easily exploited, either because they are desperate for work or because traditions of servitude such as those found in certain West African countries continue to operate (Kamara 2000, Urs 2000, Botte 2005). With regards to ‘motivated offenders’, there is no doubt that some employers will use any means necessary to turn a profit. Research suggests that this is particularly the case in low-skilled, highly labour-intensive activities such as domestic or sex work, agriculture or construction. There is a clear economic rationale to this: first, low-skilled activities rely more on work intensity than on skill, and so typically involve less educated, poorer workers who can be forced to work harder for want of a lack of alternatives. Second, it is in these labour-intensive sectors that the savings on labour costs which accrue to force will have the relatively highest impact on profits. Finally, with regards to the absence of a ‘capable guardian’, it is weak state capacity that is often blamed. In this, the

⁶ With permission, this section draws heavily on the work of Andrees and Besler 2009.

state's lack of resources and consequent inability to enforce laws, provide labour inspectorates or train effective police forces, mean that vulnerable workers operate without adequate protection, thus further facilitating their exploitation.

While these analyses make a great deal of intuitive sense, it is problematic that only factors *endogenous* to Africa are identified as responsible for the persistence of FL (Njoh and Ayuk-Etang 2012). In today's interlinked world, such analysis seems unjustifiably simplistic. For one thing, the weakness of African states is inextricably linked to the power and wealth of those in the Global North, due to histories of exploitation and the heavily skewed terms of trade. As such, and as the ILO's *Strengthening Action to End Forced Labour* report acknowledges, wider contexts also matter for any nuanced understanding of the domestic African dynamics which underpin FL (2013:1), since FL represents an inherent part of 'the underside of globalisation' (ILO 2009:2), and is linked to *exogenous* factors originating outside of Africa and often operating beyond African control (Van den Anker 2004, Bales 2005).

It is arguably similarly reductive to attribute the causality of FL to abstract concepts such as 'poverty'. Indeed, though it is identified near-universally as FL's major cause, there is almost no corresponding discussion anywhere within the institutional or governmental literature about where exactly poverty *comes from*. Poverty is thus taken as a cause-less phenomenon, with the fact that some people are so poor that they exist in 'positions of vulnerability' treated as a reality that 'just is'. Yet this is clearly problematic. Because, as was argued in Chapter 1, poverty and wealth always and everywhere exists within a political-legal context that ensures and enforces them. Who has access to which resources is necessarily a political question, with poverty therefore always the *consequence of political decisions taken by political actors*.

It is doubtless the lack of sufficiently sophisticated research that leads to this kind of analytical simplicity. Even providing an overview of FL in Africa remains a challenge, because so few of the relevant existing publications are based on anything like rigorous, defensible research. The ILO has acknowledged this (2009:12), in particular with regards to Africa, since Africa 'has perhaps received less attention than other regions' (ibid.15). Similar things have been said about THB, slavery and slavery-like practices, for all of which there is a widely-acknowledged dearth.

In part, this dearth can be explained by the fact that FL, THB and slavery are 'hidden crimes', which take place beyond the gaze of the state or outside of the formal economy. They are thus 'hard to reach'. In part, however, it can also be attributed to the lack of serious global investment in research capacity. Few countries or international organisations have made sufficient efforts to estimate, document, or gather the crucial qualitative data necessary to understand FL beyond the commonplace sensationalist snapshots.

The rest of this chapter will attempt to move beyond those where it can and to highlight them where it cannot, focussing in detail on specific examples of FL in Africa, and examining those economic sectors said to be most affected. Further basic details can be found in the Appendices.

Specific Sectors and Examples

The following sub-sections examine case studies of FL in Africa today. The discussion will highlight both what we do know and understand about these individual cases *and also what we do not know or have mistaken.*

Government Forced Labour

ILO Convention 29 was designed primarily to push governments to end their use of forced labour. The massive post-colonial reduction in state-extracted labour on the African continent suggests that this effort has largely been successful. Indeed, in contrast with the situation at the turn of independence, it is now believed that only a minority of forced labour victims in Africa today can be said to be victims of their own political authorities.

However, recent research, the work of international campaigners and that of the ILO suggest that there are exceptions. First amongst these are the many documented cases of prisoners being forced to labour while incarcerated. In Uganda, for instance, the CEACR has repeatedly noted the presence of legislation authorising compulsory labour as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the establishment. In particular, the Committee has been concerned with the following Ugandan legislation:

- the Public Order and Security Act, No. 20 of 1967, empowering the executive to restrict an individual's association or communication with others, independently of the commission of any offence and subject to penalties involving compulsory labour;
- sections 54(2)(c), 55, 56 and 56A of the Penal Code, empowering the minister to declare any combination of two or more people an unlawful society and thus render any speech, publication or activity on behalf of, or in support of, such combination illegal and punishable with imprisonment (involving an obligation to perform labour).

As the Committee has pointed out, any penal sanctions involving an obligation to perform prison labour are contrary to Convention No. 105 when imposed on persons convicted for expressing political views or views opposed to the established political system⁷. Human Rights Watch (HRW) have documented the implementation of this legislation, noting that 'thousands of prisoners are forced to work under brutal conditions, frequently beaten or abused for moving too slowly or refusing to work'⁸. Similar testimonies and concerns have been raised in Egypt⁹ and Zimbabwe¹⁰.

⁷ http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2699298; In this regard, it is worth noting that under Convention No. 29, prison labour imposed on persons convicted to prison sentences is not considered forced labour on the condition that a number of safeguards are respected.

⁸ <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/14/uganda-forced-labor-disease-imperil-prisoners>

⁹ http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2337054:NO

¹⁰ http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3064281;
see also <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/36104/mliswa-uses-prison-labour-on-farm.html>

Serious concerns have also been raised of a number of countries in which compulsory community service or development work is said to be extracted by the state. In Algeria, for example, the CEACR has for a number of years drawn attention to the incompatibility with Convention No. 29 of sections 32, 33, 34 and 38 of Act No. 84-10 of 11 February 1984 concerning civil service, as amended and supplemented by Act No. 86-11 of 19 August 1986 and by Act No. 06-15 of 14 November 2006, under which it is possible to require persons who have completed a course of higher education or training to perform a period of civil service ranging from one to four years before being able to exercise an occupation or obtain employment. The Committee has noted that, under sections 32 and 38 of the Act, any refusal to perform civil service and the resignation of the person concerned without valid reason results in the prohibition on their exercising an activity on their own account, and that any infringement will incur the penalties laid down in section 243 of the Penal Code (imprisonment ranging from three months to two years and/or a fine of between 500 and 5,000 dinars)¹¹.

Perhaps the most serious instance of government-exacted ‘community service’ in Africa is Eritrea. The CEACR has repeatedly been in contact with the Eritrean government to express its concerns and seek reassurances or reforms¹². Research suggests that these have not, however, been forthcoming. According to HRW, the Eritrean government regularly assigns conscripts to state-owned companies, such as the Segen Construction Company, who are then ‘subcontracted’ or hired out to work for foreign companies in international mining operations (2013). Many of these conscripts are ordinary citizens compelled by what HRW terms ‘the Eritrean government’s uniquely abusive programme of indefinite forced labor – the inaptly-named national service programme’ (ibid.3).

Professor Gaim Kibreab, an Eritrean national working in the UK, has conducted detailed research into this national service program (NSP). He explains that it and the related Warsai-Yikaalo Development Campaign (WYDC) ‘were conceived and implemented as instruments for creating a cohesive national identity, as well as moulding a political community’, in light of the war and continued tensions with neighbouring Ethiopia (2009:43). Initially, there was much support for the programme, in particular since it was believed that ‘the danger of multi-ethnic and multi-faith “chaos” [could] be avoided by inculcating national values on the hundreds of thousands of conscripts who originate from disparate ethnolinguistic groups’ (ibid).

Despite these valiant goals, however, evidence suggests that the past decade has seen the NS and WYDC quickly deteriorate into mass-scale FL and political persecution. The Eritrean government has indeed *legally enshrined* the extraction of NS labour even ‘under the threat of penalty’. As Kibreab explains (ibid.57), the Proclamation on NS holds that:

‘penalties imposed for noncompliance consist of a fine, or a term of imprisonment of up to five years, or both. The five years penalty

¹¹ See also Paragraphs 89 and 90 of the ILO’S 2007 *General Survey*, as well as Paragraphs 282-285 of the 2012 *General Survey on the Fundamental Conventions Concerning Rights at Work* for further details on this issue.

¹² http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2337201:NO

applies to those who escape abroad to avoid national service (Proc. 82/1995, Art. 37). The proclamation also stipulates that draft evaders' and deserters' "rights of license, visa, land tenure, and the rights to work will be suspended" until the age of fifty (ibid., Art. 37)'.

This has had serious consequences. Noting that 'the population of Eritrea represents 0.4% of the total African population, but 9% of all Africans who sought asylum in the UK between 2001 and 2007', Kibreab shows that ever more Eritreans are fleeing the country precisely in order to escape this violent conscription (ibid. 54). Interviews he has conducted with escapees attest to his analysis. He explains:

'The existence of detention facilities and widespread practices of torture were reported by all conscripts interviewed by the author inside and outside the country. Aman, a deserter who lives in Nottingham, said that he was subjected to the helicopter method of punishment, i.e. his hands and feet were tied behind his back and he was laid on the ground with his face down from time to time for three months' (ibid.57).

The International Trades Unions Confederation (ITUC) shares Kibreab's assessment, concluding that the Eritrean state is a totalitarian authority which extracts labour from citizens through widespread coercion¹³.

Compulsion in Conflict

Labour compulsion in the context of conflict is also said to be prevalent in a number of African countries. As the ILO's 2007 *General Survey* states:

'Though the physical abduction of persons for slavery and forced labour purposes is no longer common, it still takes place in a situation of armed conflict in certain regions. Thus, over the past decades the Committee has been examining information concerning the practices of abduction, trafficking and forced labour affecting thousands of women and children, and also men, in the context of civil conflicts in a number of countries. The Committee has observed that the situations concerned constitute gross violations of the Convention, since the victims are forced to perform work for which they have not offered themselves voluntarily, under extremely harsh conditions, combined with ill-treatment which may include torture and death, as well as sexual exploitation' (p.36).

Most prominent among such cases in recent years has been that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the second joint report of seven United Nations experts on the situation in DRC, the experts noted that the mines in the Kivu provinces continued to be exploited by armed groups, especially the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), and expressed their concern at 'reports that civilians are still subjected to forced labour, extortion and illegal taxation, and that sexual exploitation of women and girls is rife in these

¹³ <http://www.refworld.org/country,COI,ITUC,ANNUALREPORT,eri,,4fd88951c,0.html>

mining areas'. The report also emphasizes that 'women and girls have been abducted and held as sexual slaves both by FARDC members and other armed actors, and have been subject to collective rapes for weeks and months, often accompanied by additional atrocities'¹⁴.

The Confederation of Trade Unions of Congo (CSC) and the ITUC have made similar observations, presented to and noted by the CEACR. The former have 'confirmed the practices of abduction of women and girls and, to a lesser degree, of men and boys with a view to their being used for forced labour and sexual slavery by the armed groups'. They have also documented 'elderly women...being abducted for domestic work'¹⁵. Likewise, the ITUC have confirmed:

'the persistence of cases of sexual slavery, especially in mines in the regions of North Kivu, Province Orientale, Katanga and East Kasai, perpetrated by illegal armed groups and elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). The ITUC emphasizes that the persons concerned have no chance of escaping because they are guarded 24 hours a day by soldiers. The ITUC also refers to several cases of the forced enrolment of boys and young men by various armed groups, especially by the troops of Bosco Ntaganda, in the Masisi territory, or by the rebels of the M23, in particular in the province of North Kivu. The ITUC lists several attacks carried out by these groups in 2012 in various communities in this province, during which violence was systematically used to force civilians to transport arms, ammunition, booty from looting and other provisions up to the front line'¹⁶.

Similar reports have been documented in a range of other countries, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. In each of these countries, the armed group known as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has for many years carried out attacks and atrocities on civilians, including repeated abductions of children. Though LRA activities have declined, the group are still at large and research has demonstrated that the children abducted by them have been forced to stay with the group as forced recruits or sexual slaves. Estimates as to the number of children abducted by the LRA are commonly in the tens of thousands.

Armed groups and state militias beyond the LRA are also said to forcibly recruit adults and children into their ranks in the CAR and Sudan. In CAR, the UN Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict in the CAR 'noted in his report that the recruitment of children by armed groups remains a source of serious concern, especially in the north-east and east of the country (paragraph 15). The report reveals that children are still among the ranks and continue to engage in combat with the various armed groups, namely, the Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et de la Démocratie (APRD), the Union des Forces

¹⁴ <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-63.pdf>

¹⁵ http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3084220

¹⁶ Ibid.

Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR), the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP), the Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLJC) and the Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC)¹⁷.

In Sudan, continued unrest in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Abyei has also led to a number of documented FL-type atrocities, despite government commitments to ensure prevention. With regard to Darfur, the report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) of 17 April 2012 indicates that, between December 2011 and April 2012, clashes between different forces occurred sporadically, leading to ten incidents of kidnappings involving local residents and three documented cases of abductions. In Southern Kordofan, the 13th periodic report of UNOCHR notes that the Human Rights Component of the United Nations Mission to Sudan received several reports of alleged abductions or disappearances of people in the region¹⁸. Tensions are still high today, and the risk remains of such atrocities being repeated.

Sexual Exploitation

The previous section noted the frequent forced sexual exploitation of women and girls in the context of conflict. Forced prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation are not, however, only confined to conflict situations. Indeed, the ILO's latest *Global Estimate of Forced Labour* calculates that as many as 22% of the overall worldwide total of forced labourers may be victims of forced sexual exploitation (2012:13), which in Africa points to potentially hundreds of thousands of women and girls.

Zimbabwe is often identified as paradigmatic of a country affected by this issue. On the basis of its enquiries, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) declared in 2012 that it was 'concerned at the continuing prevalence of trafficking in women and girls in the country, at the lack of statistical sex disaggregated data, as well as at the low reporting rate'. Additionally, it lamented 'the State party's failure to address the root causes of trafficking and prostitution, including poverty, which impede the State party's efforts to address these issues in a serious way', along with 'the lack of shelters and counselling services in the State party for victims of trafficking and prostitution'¹⁹. The US TIP Office has echoed this assessment, recently concluding that:

'Women and girls from Zimbabwean towns bordering South Africa, Mozambique, and Zambia are subjected to prostitution in brothels that cater to long-distance truck drivers on both sides of the borders. The number of prostitution rings in Zimbabwe [has] continued to rise'²⁰.

¹⁷ http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:2700690

¹⁸ http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3065391

¹⁹ <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-ZWE-CO-2-5.pdf>

²⁰ <http://www.refworld.org/docid/51c2f37427.html>

Though these reports demonstrate the existence of recent data on the trafficking and sexual exploitation that takes place *within* Africa, most of the best contemporary research pertains to the ways in which African women are tricked or coerced into becoming sex workers *outside* of the African continent. The ILO's recent report – *Tricked and Trapped: Human Trafficking in the Middle East* – is a good example of this recent work. It examines the ways in which migrant domestic work can often be linked to sex trafficking in the Middle East (2013). Sometimes, it explains, Ethiopian women will migrate legally to become maids in Middle Eastern households, only to find their passports confiscated and their work very different from that which they expected. At other times, a woman employed as a maid may find her experience so abusive and exploitative that she flees for her own safety. Then:

'Having left the workplace without the employer's prior consent, these domestic workers, most of whom come from Asia or Africa, are at risk of detention and deportation by the national authorities. They are therefore particularly vulnerable to exploitation by their boyfriends or sex brokers (pimps); sometimes they are even abducted outright by fellow migrant taxi drivers whom they approach for help, who see them as a commercial asset' (ibid. 58).

Other cases of sex trafficking are said to exist where migrant women know in advance about the kinds of work that they will be doing, but find that work exacted under a contract that resembles debt bondage. The most frequently cited case of this is that of Nigerians in Italy. The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has collected evidence about the pressures applied to Nigerian women who earn money in Italy from commercial sex. The report notes that some Nigerian women arrive in Italy to be told that they owe the people who have organised their travel a debt of 50,000-60,000 Euros. They find their freedom of movement constrained until the debt has been repaid, they face threats of supernatural retaliation if they fail to follow orders or to repay their alleged debt, and they may experience threats to both their and their family's physical safety if they fail to comply (2003).

Domestic Work

Just as sexual exploitation is a problem that predominantly sees women and girls as victims, so too is domestic work, which reports suggest is one of the economic sectors most affected by FL in Africa today. In CEACR comments regarding the implementation of Convention No. 29, for instance, concerns regarding trafficking for domestic service are raised in countries right across the continent. So too with US TIP Reports, which frequently cite domestic work as an end-point for victims of trafficking in Africa.

That domestic work is so closely linked to trafficking and forced labour is in itself unsurprising. As scholars have emphasised in contexts across the globe, domestic workers are among the most vulnerable of any workers in any sector (Anderson 2000). This is for a number of reasons. First, their work takes place away from the eyes either of labour inspectors or at times even neighbours, meaning that they are isolated from potential sources of protection. Second, given that they are often

located far from their personal or familial networks, and in places and amidst people whose languages may be unfamiliar, their isolation is further compounded. Third, domestic workers are often relatively poor and uneducated, meaning that they have few livelihood options beyond the abusive domestic service that they find themselves in. And fourth, their immigration status is often linked to their remaining in their current employment, which forces them either to accept abuse or face deportation.

An important African case study documenting FL in domestic service has been conducted by the ILO in Zambia. The findings of this study can perhaps be taken as emblematic of the situation on the continent. The study deploys an innovative methodology examining labour-related complaints received by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) and the Human Rights Commission (HRC). It records all complaints over a five year period that relate to employment, non-payment of wages, poor working conditions, and various other relevant categories. Hundreds of cases were compiled and analysed. The study also complimented this with semi-structured interviews and focus-group discussions with domestic workers, maid recruitment centres and victims of trafficking.

What the study found was that, as is the case elsewhere, domestic workers are especially hired by middle-class and wealthy households and that they mainly come from poor households in the peri-urban areas of major towns as well as the rural areas. *Legally, they are largely unprotected as they work away from labour inspectorates and without union coverage.* Widespread complaints of mistreatment include the ‘salary not being raised after probation, delayed payment of salary, lack of rest, finishing work late, no overtime allowance for working on public holidays, inadequate food or being fed on left-overs, not being allowed to use household toilet facilities, and sexual harassment’ (2008a:62). All of this constitutes exploitation in most common senses of the term. Crucially, violence was also documented in certain cases, while the study noted that sometimes domestic workers’ identity cards are taken from them, possibly as a means to prevent them from leaving, which would certainly class their work as ‘forced’.

Traditional Forms of Slavery

The issue of ‘traditional forms of slavery’ has received significant media, political and academic attention over recent years in Africa. Debates around the issue have been highly contentious, and often hotly contested, as different bodies claim that slavery either exists or does not (see, for example, Kamara 2000, Urs 2000, Botte 2005). As Dottridge explains, though slavery and slavery-like practices have been formally illegalised for many years across the continent:

‘Information collected by historians and social scientists across the Sahel shows that people of slave status remained attached to many pastoralist households when slavery was formally abolished, and that the legal abolition of slavery by colonial or post-colonial governments did not effectively address the predicament of individuals of slave status. In some cases the relationships did evolve, but continued to involve servitude or a servile status: for example, slaves involved in agriculture became share-croppers, giving part of their crop to the people for whom

they had once worked directly. Significant numbers of the descendants of such people have, according to some reports, continued living and working with the descendants of their ancestors' "owners" (2005a:23).

NGOs, trades unions and various campaigning organisations have documented a wide range of abuses to which such slave descendants are subject, including forced labour. The ILO's CEACR has therefore dedicated considerable attention to examining the issue, in particular in the cases of Niger and Mauritania.

While both governments have expressed their readiness to work with the ILO to resolve any outstanding problems, and although various legal reforms and policy platforms have been put in place, the CEACR still has significant reservations. In Niger, for instance, the Committee laments the serious lack of enforcement and the lack of an effective national strategy²¹. Likewise, in Mauritania:

'The Committee observes that the ITUC emphasizes in its observations that it is extremely difficult for victims of slavery to overcome cultural and legal obstacles in order to be able to lodge complaints and take legal action against their masters. The ITUC refers to the reluctance at various levels of the administration to enforce the law. Even though several victims have attempted to take legal action against their masters, only one conviction was handed down in November 2011'²².

Similarly, the Committee cite the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, who states that though she had heard of cases of slavery being reported to the relevant authorities, these cases were reclassified under the heading of 'inheritance or land dispute', were not pursued owing to insufficient documentary evidence, or saw the complainant retract the case under pressure from his or her extended family, master or even the local authorities²³.

Mining

In recent years, attention to forced labour and trafficking in the mining sector has risen sharply. Countries including Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC have all been identified as home to adults and children who work in mines and find themselves in situations of debt bondage or trafficking. While there always exists a market for precious stones such as diamonds, and while it has been well documented that this private demand can fuel guerrilla groups mining 'blood diamonds', increasingly FL in mining is being linked to the pressures of global commodity demand, particularly as manifest by unscrupulous multi-national corporations in search of precious metals such as gold, or for those minerals key to mobile phone production, such as coltan²⁴.

²¹ http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3078821:NO

²² http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3080704:NO

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ <http://www.verite.org/Commodities/ColtanTungstenTin>;
see also <http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-minerals>

In the DRC, the CEACR has noted the prevalence of FL in coltan mining, while a recent high profile report by the NGO, Free the Slaves, has identified many cases of coltan-based FL in East Kivu. Citing over 900 people interviewed by a local partner organisation, they suggest that almost 30% of respondents were victims of forced labour, while another 23% were victims of debt bondage. With debt bondage, they explain that:

'new workers are required to borrow money to purchase food, supplies, and the tools and equipment needed to keep them employed, or when they have "inherited" the debt of deceased family members. The return on their work proves to be insufficient and borrowed money is exhausted as the worker struggles to pay for food and drink, lodging, medical expenses and in some cases, school fees' (2013:17).

Similar claims have been echoed in countries including Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria. In particular, these claims have been part of a huge upsurge in attention to the specific problem of children trafficked to mines and quarries for stone-breaking or gold-sifting²⁵. Typical of the coverage that this issue has been receiving is an Al-Jazeera report from Ghana suggesting that children as young as seven are 'the manual hands in the mining process', that they have been kidnapped, trafficked, and ruthlessly abused in the process²⁶. Or, from Nigeria, that Beninese 'child slaves' have been kidnapped²⁷ or 'sold' by their parents to traffickers who use them to crush rocks²⁸.

In contrast to the seemingly well-founded accusations regarding DRC, however, an emerging body of academic research is starting to bring into question the validity of these claims, *along with wider claims that artisanal mining is always and everywhere a hotbed of child slavery, trafficking or debt bondage*²⁹. In the case of Ghana, Samuel Okyere spent months living in and around the Kenyasi gold mine, interviewing and observing 57 adolescent workers. What he found was that, while work was challenging, it was simply not comparable to the brutal, FL-type exploitation depicted in media accounts, government pronouncements or even in sectoral desk studies³⁰. It involved no restrictions on worker movement, no coercion, and no underpayment. In Okyere's words:

'Overall, the ways in which children worked at the site were devoid of abuse, violence, bondage, servitude, exploitation and other ills that mark children's employment in such scenarios elsewhere. None of the participants mentioned any cases of maltreatment or abuse in their

²⁵ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Nofutureforenslavedchildrenworkinginmines.aspx>

²⁶ <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/africainvestigates/2011/11/201111307453977885.html>

²⁷ http://blaisap.typepad.fr/mon_weblog/2012/02/384-enfants-esclaves-sauvs-des-carrires-dabeokuta-au-nigeria.html

²⁸ http://www.huhuonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=356:abeokuta-child-slaves-working-nigeriasquarries&catid=67:art&Itemid=369

²⁹ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Slavery/SR/A-HRC-18-30_en.pdf

³⁰ 'Child labour in mining and quarrying is in virtually all cases a Worst Form of Child labour because of the extent and severity of the hazards and the risks of death, injury and disease. There is no justification – poverty included – for children to work in this sector. It is literally back breaking work. It is relatively straightforward, therefore for governments to legislate to include mining and quarrying activities on their legally-binding, national hazardous child labour lists thereby making them prohibited activities for children' (ILO 2005:1).

work at the site; neither did the researcher's own observations and enquiries reveal anything of that nature' (2013:85).

These findings have been paralleled by the present author's own research with Beninese quarry-working adolescents in Abeokuta, Nigeria (Howard 2012, 2013). Though the dominant perspective on this has suggested that adolescent labour is either coerced or tricked in Abeokuta, none of the dozens of teenagers I have interviewed have ever had such an experience. Indeed, having observed them at work, I am able to corroborate what they so emphatically tell anyone who asks them – that while their work may be physically demanding, *it is never any more so than the farm work they would legally be doing at 'home' in Benin, nor is it ever something to which they do not willingly offer their consent.* Moreover, in their understanding, this work represents the best option available to them for earning the money necessary to live. None have left their employment empty-handed, and many migrate back-and-forth between Benin and Nigeria as finances require. Similarly nuanced findings have been presented in a regional action-research project led by Terre des Hommes³¹, thus bringing into question the widespread link between artisanal mining and the trafficking or FL of children.

None of this is to deny that, in certain cases, children as well as adults are indeed exploited or forced to work in mines or quarries, just as they are in other sectors of the economy. The major point, however, is that *we need to know what is happening on the ground in each case before making policies, since one catch-all narrative that links particular economic sectors to FL is inaccurate, just as one catch-all policy will therefore likely be ineffective.* Put simply, then, 'not all quarries are quarries, and not all children are children'. In other words, while some quarries do involve unacceptable working conditions, others do not, and while some children are forced into quarry labour, many others are not, since they are actually socially mature adolescents consenting to their work. Under such circumstances, it is worth recalling the message advocated by Bourdillon et al. in Chapter 1. In their opinion, we need to begin from the level of workers themselves when understanding exploitative labour and what to do about it. For them, it is workers, young or old, and their communities, who are best placed to decide on which kinds of work is in their best interests and on whether or not that work counts as exploitative, instead of the distant or ill-informed law-makers who, in the absence of good data, often find themselves relying on the sensationalist stories of news organisations or unverified desk studies as a basis for their policies.

Agriculture

Questions over data accuracy and thus policy effectiveness have plagued another of Africa's major economic sectors in recent years: agriculture. There is no doubt that agricultural production is a site of forced and abusive labour in Africa. Indeed, this is intuitive, given how much of the African economy agriculture accounts for (65% of the workforce and 32% of continental GDP³²), and given

³¹ http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/french/Rapport_FR-web.pdf

³²

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21935583~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html>

how reliant agriculture is on unskilled, highly labour-intensive production techniques. Clear cases of agricultural FL have been documented, particularly in Malawi and with tobacco production (ILO-IPEC 2006).

Though FL exists in this field, there are many clear examples where the *assumption* of FL has proved wrong. This is especially the case with cocoa production. Over the course of the past decade, dozens of media reports have surfaced to claim widespread extreme coercion in the plantations of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Huge pressure has been placed on the major cocoa conglomerates to 'rid their supply chains of child and slave labour'. And two US lawmakers – Senator Tom Harkin and Representative Eliot Engel – have sponsored the creation of an industry-wide Protocol to 'clean up' cocoa supply chains. So extensive has been the belief that adults, and particularly children, are frequently victims of slavery-like practices in this sector that it has become almost commonly accepted. Detailed academic research, however, suggests that the story is not so simple. How is this so?

The Payson Center for International Development and Technology Transfer at Tulane University was subcontracted by the International Cocoa Initiative (ICI) established under the Harkin-Engel Protocol to analyse whether child slavery or trafficking featured in cocoa production in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Having conducted two nationally-representative, large-scale surveys over two years, what they reported in 2011 was that, while under-18s in both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire do often work in cocoa production, almost always they perform only 'light work'. Moreover, they found it exceedingly rare for any under-18s to be forced into work, with only 0.5% reporting that they had been. Significantly, and in contrast to the dominant assumption that work takes the place of school, the vast majority of working under-18s *combined* both work and school, with many admitting that it was precisely their work which afforded them the opportunity to continue their schooling (2011, 2011b).

These findings have been echoed by detailed ethnographic studies conducted by anthropologists living *within* the plantation communities said to be home to child slaves. Amanda Berlan is one such academic. Describing plantation production as an overwhelmingly small-scale, family-run, cottage industry, Berlan has stated that extreme coercion, trafficking or slavery are almost entirely absent in this sector. Orla Ryan has concurred, in her recent book on the subject (2011). Once again, therefore, it seems that an absence of good quality, accurate, empirical data has allowed for the perpetuation of sensationalist and often misplaced claims of forced exploitation. This has significant policy consequences, as we shall see in the following chapter.

When reflecting on how it is that these inaccuracies are allowed to emerge and then remained unchallenged for so long, Amanda Berlan comments:

'My personal suspicion is that many of the[m]...are based on desk research rather than resulting from any reliable field-based investigation' (2005: 164)

My own research in Africa has led me to draw similar conclusions. It is telling, for instance, that of the tens of Beninese, Nigerian and international policy-makers I have interviewed who decry child trafficking in Abeokuta's artisanal mines, none have ever met, let alone conducted research with, the young workers they describe as trafficked. This observation is not designed to impugn the unquestionably well-intentioned policy-makers it concerns; rather, it wishes to highlight *the absurdity of a policy-making system in which policy-makers are neither required nor offered the opportunity to come into contact with and learn about the very targets of their policies.*

Conclusion

The overview presented in this chapter has offered a brief outline of some of what we currently do and do not know about FL in Africa. It is clear that we have some important data regarding the dynamics of FL, THB or slavery on the continent, just as it is clear that myriad cases of FL continue to affect thousands of lives. In particular, the fact that certain governments extract FL from their citizens or that conflict is inextricably linked to FL-type abuses has been irrefutably well documented. Yet it is clear that more and better data is needed. This includes, in particular, that pertaining to the FL of children, who are all too readily characterised as victims. It also includes the qualitative, ground-level information crucial to developing nuanced understandings which transcend sensationalist reporting. Such information will be essential as we work to improve our efforts to prevent and protect, and it is to these efforts that the report now turns.

CHAPTER 3

WHAT IS AND IS NOT HAPPENING IN RESPONSE

This chapter will examine what actions governments, civil society bodies and businesses have been taking over the past 15 years against FL in Africa. These efforts have been widespread, diverse and have involved the spending of billions of dollars. The chapter will focus in some detail on a number of the most significant, while the Appendices offer a long list of the many organisations engaged in this field. In line with the critical goals underpinning this report, the chapter will also focus at length on some of the drawbacks characterising current efforts and on the insufficiencies undermining their effectiveness.

Overview of Official Responses

Governmental Initiatives at National and Regional Level

Most countries in Africa have ratified the ILO Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No. 105), the Slavery Conventions, the Convention on the Abolition of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No. 182) and the Palermo Protocol. Most also have their own domestic legislative frameworks concerning these crimes, meaning that they find themselves broadly in line with international legal norms.

Individual national efforts to operationalise those legal norms vary. The ILO is at the forefront of documenting those in a country-by-country database. This database attests to a wide range of activities taking place in Africa. Though they are too numerous to mention in a report such as this, they include, in Nigeria, the establishment of a nationwide anti-trafficking agency (NAPTIP) responsible for border policing, detection and repatriation of trafficked workers. In Zambia, they involve the launch of The Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP), which prioritizes, among others, promotion of decent, non-exploitative employment, with particular attention to youth, women and people living with disabilities; and supporting the elimination of child labour, starting with its worst forms. South Africa has established the Tsireledzani initiative (led by the National Prosecuting Authority) to ensure national compliance with the Palermo Protocol. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Joint Ministerial Committee on the Fight against Trafficking, Exploitation, and Child Labour was created in November 2011 to better coordinate the fight against exploitation. It is led by the Ministry of Labour and brings together representatives from 13 Ministries, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Family, Women and Children, and the Ministry of Agriculture. While in Ethiopia, the government has established the National Anti-Trafficking Council, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and comprising 12 line Ministries at Ministerial level. It is also the only Sub-Saharan African country to have ratified ILO Convention No. 181 on Private Employment Agencies.

Though there is diversity in the national responses to FL in Africa, the one policy that has united all countries engaged is the attempt to raise citizen awareness, particularly around the dangers of labour and sex trafficking. The author's own

research confirms this in Benin and Nigeria, as does the ILO's analysis in *Strengthening Action to End Forced Labour*:

'In practice, the most widespread prevention activity is awareness raising. The majority of campaigns aim to raise awareness of trafficking in persons among the general public or particular vulnerable groups. In Burkina Faso, for example, the Ministry of Social Action has distributed information flyers in local languages, hosted lectures, film discussions and theatre forums on child labour and trafficking, while an "information caravan" has reached people in border regions and along major migration routes' (2013:27).

Various co-ordinated efforts have also taken place *between countries* at the regional level in order to harmonise or advance regional policy. In 2006, for example, West and Central African states signed the Multilateral Cooperation Agreement to Combat Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children in West and Central Africa. That same year, 'The Ouagadougou Action Plan' was adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, stipulating a three-pronged strategy of prevention, provision, and prosecution with regards to THB. The African Union Department of Social Affairs (DSA) was tasked with advocating the implementation of the plan, and it subsequently launched the African Union Commission Initiative against Trafficking (AU.COMMIT) in order to do so. As part of this effort, AU.COMMIT organized a workshop in Abuja in 2010, pushing for the operationalization of the Ouagadougou Action Plan across West Africa.

This effort was echoed also by the 2nd ECOWAS Conference of Ministers of Labour and Employment (Côte d'Ivoire, April 2009), which endorsed a Strategic Plan of Action for an ECOWAS Labour Policy. This Plan has, among other issues, placed fighting THB, eliminating forced labour, and the removal of discriminatory laws and practices as its priority interventions to be implemented from 2009 to 2014.

In Southern Africa too, regional efforts exist. In May 2009, for instance, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Ministerial Conference branded trafficking in persons a 'criminal activity' that requires clear and comprehensive legislation to prevent and combat. The Conference subsequently adopted a ten-year Regional Strategic Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children. SADC also adopted a Labour Migration Action Plan in May 2013. Furthermore, during the SADC Employment and Labour Sector Workshop on Labour Migration held in August 2013, the Ministers agreed on the need to develop a regional labour migration policy.

Beyond Africa's borders too, political partnerships have been developing. Recently the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment endorsed its 2011-2013 Action Plan, which aims to support the Regional Economic Communities and strengthen their institutional and human capacities to prevent trafficking and FL, to protect victims, and to prosecute perpetrators. This has included funding for the many national anti-trafficking agencies established

over the course of the past decade and now at the forefront of the fight against the continent's abusive labour practices.

International Organisation Anti-Trafficking Programmes

It is not only governments who have been engaged in anti-trafficking efforts over the past decade in Africa; so too have a variety of other bodies, and in particular International Organisations (IOs), along with the NGOs they sub-contract. The following sub-section will highlight two of the most high profile initiatives as an illustration of what has taken place.

The first, and perhaps most widespread, has been the ILO's own LUTRENA Programme, which is officially entitled '*The Programme to Combat the Trafficking of Children for Labour Exploitation in West and Central Africa*'. LUTRENA began in July of 2001 as a multi-donor funded programme covering 12 countries in West and Central Africa. Its first phase consisted of a comprehensive set of activities in each of the programme countries, implemented in stages and aiming at contributing to the effective prevention and abolition of trafficking in children for exploitative employment in the region. Its main components were:

- Institutional Development
- Direct Action
- Research, Documentation and Monitoring
- Sub-Regional Cooperation and Joint Action

In practice, this has involved a number of overlapping elements. In terms of research, LUTRENA commissioned a number of 'national studies' into child trafficking, conducted by sub-contracted agencies on behalf of national ministries. LUTRENA has also helped fund the ministries in question, at times seconding staff or paying staff wages, and frequently supporting the establishment of 'village vigilance committees' to represent and promote the ministries' fight against trafficking at the level of the village.

LUTRENA has also been instrumental in promoting legal developments regarding child trafficking in the region, on national, bi-national and sub-regional levels, just as it has been in bringing the region's countries together to set up joint plans of action. At the ground level, its first phase undertook various sporadic 'anti-poverty initiatives', on the understanding that poverty is the prime cause of trafficking. These included, predominantly, the roll-out of income generating activities (IGAs), amongst which we can list activities such as textile painting, sewing, simple cosmetics production, the production of jewels for women, and cake and pastry shops.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM)'s *Southern African Counter-Trafficking Assistance Programme* (SACTAP) is another example of a large-scale and well-funded IO anti-trafficking initiative established in recent years. It commenced in 2003, and is said to be a key player in Southern Africa's efforts to tackle and respond to human trafficking. Active across the Southern African region, SACTAP aims to support and develop the capacity of governments and

civil society groups to deal with the problem of trafficking in Southern Africa, while also offering assistance to victims and raising awareness among the general public.

SACTAP is organized around four key components of counter-trafficking intervention. These are:

- Victim Assistance
- Capacity Building
- Research and Data Collection
- Information and Awareness-Raising

In practical terms, what the programme has therefore involved are activities similar to those funded under LUTRENA. This has meant basic data production, and in particular the funding of quantitative studies and their dissemination. It has involved massive efforts at awareness-raising, often in partnership with NGOs. It has also produced regular information campaigns for the general public and published a quarterly bulletin called *Eye on Human Trafficking* for electronic distribution.

SACTAP has worked closely with government and law enforcement officials, both contributing to the human trafficking legislative process through consultation with policy drafters and/or Law Reform Commissions in South Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, and building the capacity of law enforcement and other government officials, as well as civil society groups, through training and the provision of other technical support.

Uniquely, SACTAP has also worked directly with identified victims of trafficking, providing trafficked persons with safe accommodation, medical and psychosocial assistance, and a range of return and reintegration options.

Private Sector Business Engagement

International organisations and NGOs have been accompanied in the recent fight against FL in Africa by businesses and business-focussed initiatives, which are now among the most high-profile initiatives of all those designed to fight against abusive labour. Of the many of these that exist, there are two that have been most effective at mobilising public and media attention. These are the *Fairtrade Campaign* and the *International Cocoa Initiative* (ICI).

The ICI has been briefly discussed above. It came into being in 2001, after a spate of media reports accused chocolate multi-nationals of benefiting from (child) slave labour on the cocoa plantations of West Africa. This led the US House of Representatives to pass a rider to an agricultural appropriations bill that would have had the US Food and Drug Administration create 'slave free' labelling requirements for cocoa products. The cocoa industry strongly objected to such state regulation, and after much negotiation, therefore agreed to sign the Harkin-Engel Protocol, which established a self-regulation mechanism by which the cocoa industry would itself assure that slavery and the worst forms of child labour were absent from its procurement chains. The ICI was the body created to oversee

and sustain this process, and it represents the apex of ‘one of the first agreements to self-regulate an industry in American history and one of the first times the strategy has been used to address an international human rights problem outside of the law’ (Payson Center, 2011:13).

The Fairtrade Campaign, by contrast, concentrates less on directly shaping large-scale business practice itself and more on influencing consumer choices as an indirect mechanism for then shaping that business practice. The movement emerged originally in the 1960s as a consumer-based attempt to address the structural inequalities underpinning North–South trade relations. It focused heavily on the use of labeling, as a tool for demonstrating to consumers that the product they were purchasing and paying a premium price for was produced under conditions and for a price that were fair to the primary producer. As Freidberg explains:

‘Its original and still defining purpose is the fair price: it guarantees producers a price pegged above the world market’s and shielded against market volatility...The labels assure consumers not only that the producers of their coffee or bananas are receiving a price premium (i.e. fair trade banana producers receive \$1.75 per box above the world market price) and that they are investing this premium in “social and environmental projects” (Raynolds 2000: 301), the labels also certify that the producers, whether they are peasant co-operatives or plantations, meet specified labour and environmental standards, and undergo regular inspections by independent monitors’ (2003:30).

The Fairtrade brand – and, crucially, its massive commercial popularity and success – thus places pressure on the large multi-national businesses purchasing commodities from primary producers in Africa and across the Global South to ensure that those producers work in conditions and receive prices which are deemed fair. This of course includes being free from FL and the poverty-underpinned compulsion to exploit or allow exploitation. That a giant corporation such as Starbucks has committed to purchasing Fairtrade coffee is testament to the power this campaign wields. And in recent years, it has inspired parallels, of which the UK-based *Ethical Trade Initiative* (ETI) is the most influential. The ETI’s goal is also to use trade to help ‘make substantial improvements to the lives of poor working people around the world’. Membership includes NGOs and large Western retailers, all of whom are ‘required to bring their supply chains into compliance with ETI’s “base code”, which draws on the International Labour Organization’s standards for, among other things, working conditions, wage levels and child labour’ (Freidberg 2003:30). As with Fairtrade, ETI is thus about consumer-inspired, self-regulatory, standard-setting for large-scale business and the small businesses they work with.

Drawbacks with Current Approaches

Though, as the above sections should have made clear, there are a plethora of initiatives attempting directly or indirectly to fight against FL in Africa, many of these initiatives face a number of challenges to their effectiveness. Moreover,

even where efforts are effective in achieving the immediate goals they set for themselves, major questions remain as to whether or not these will be sufficient to achieve the wider goal of eradicating FL on the continent. The following section will therefore reflect on a number of these challenges and questions, drawing on a variety of contemporary research to do so.

At Governmental and International Organisation Level

- Lack of Ground-Level Data and Understanding

Chapter 2 highlighted the need for reliable, ground-level understandings and detailed qualitative as well as quantitative research in order for political actors to be able to understand FL in Africa and therefore build successful anti-FL strategies. In the absence of this research, such strategies can either be misplaced or at times even outright counterproductive. Unfortunately, however, it is currently undeniable that good quality data on FL are at a premium everywhere in the world, including in Africa.

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has made this very clear, in its review of US anti-trafficking work. With regards to data accuracy, the GAO asserts that '[A]ccuracy is in doubt because of methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and numerical discrepancies' (2006:1). Professor Janie Chuang, a US legal scholar and an expert on both trafficking and forced labour, echoes this analysis, pointing to the major problem that agencies like the US TIP Office face in relying on second-hand data of questionable quality:

'The TIP Office reporting staff – comprised of approximately 10 individuals – is responsible for collecting and analyzing data regarding the anti-trafficking laws and policies of 150 countries...Because they rely heavily on second-hand data, the credibility of the TIP Report country assessments depends on the quality of the sources to which the TIP Office has access' (2006:475).

A recent meta-review of all English-language data and research on human trafficking conducted by the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) suggests that the reliance on (often poor quality) second-hand data is a problem that plagues the entire field. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the ISIM team used EndNote software to compile a bibliography of all non-media publications relating to trafficking and written in English. The bibliography they put together 'includes journal articles, books, and dissertations from the catalogues and online databases of several major US universities. It also contains reports and conference papers issued by international organizations, governmental institutions, think-tanks, universities, and international and national non-governmental organizations' (Gozdziaik and Bump 2008:15). It thus represents the largest aggregation of English-language, trafficking-related literature in existence. In total, it comprises 741 relevant documents, of which 429 are institutional reports and 218 are academic journal articles. Of these pieces, *the vast majority are second-hand reports, desk reviews and prescriptive policy proposals*. Relatively few are based on 'systematic, empirically grounded' or theoretically sound research (ibid.9).

In ISIM's analysis, this represents a serious problem, since:

'those responsible for addressing trafficking in persons and related issues must be able to differentiate between the often sensational publications intended to raise awareness about the issue and the more serious literature, based on systematic, methodologically rigorous, and peer-reviewed empirical research' (ibid. p4)³³.

We saw in Chapter 2 how the lack of this peer-reviewed empirical research can lead to the preponderance of inaccurate, sensationalist understandings in the mining and cocoa sectors. It can also lead to policy strategies that are either ineffectual or poorly targeted. The national and regional efforts against child trafficking in West Africa are a classic case in point here. Across the sub-region, governments, IOs and NGOs operated for much of the last decade on the assumption that the best way to protect the young from trafficking was to keep them at home, in school, and away from labour migration. This assumption was itself based on the false premise that young people are always in danger when they migrate and that they therefore only migrate when tricked, kidnapped, forced by tradition or under the false impression that to do so will be beneficial for them. The resulting effort to keep them 'at home' involved (and continues to involve) tens of millions of dollars, massive anti-movement sensitisation campaigns, increased border patrols and the establishment of 'village vigilance committees' in countries including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali and Nigeria. Unfortunately, however, a wide range of academic research has shown this effort to have been futile. Young people still move in large numbers, they do so because doing so offers them a chance to 'advance' in the way that staying in their home villages does not, and they do so irrespective of the efforts of the authorities, who constitute, at best, a misguided nuisance to be navigated (Castle and Diarra 2003, Hashim 2003, Thorsen 2007, Dottridge 2007, Morganti 2011, Hashim and Thorsen 2011, Howard 2012, 2013). What these findings demonstrate, then, is the need not only for more comprehensive understandings of what happens *before* policy is put in place, but also for more systematic long-term impact studies of how that policy has or has not worked *after* it has been established.

- Problems with Implementation

National and international policy and project work is not only limited by a lack of solid base-data, however; often, policies or projects face internal implementation challenges that undermine what they seek to achieve. In the African context, this has been nowhere better demonstrated than with the 'village committees' (VCs) that were established across the continent as a flagship part of the last decade's explosion of anti-trafficking initiatives.

According to one recent IPEC publication:

³³ The ILO concurs with this analysis, lamenting recently that of the 25 African national anti-trafficking action plans reviewed for a recent report, only two were based on any kind of defensible statistical enquiry (2009:43).

'Local vigilance committees (LVCs) are composed of community volunteers. Their chief role is to mobilize the community to take action against trafficking, monitor the well-being of children and migrant behaviour, identify and intercept children at risk of becoming victims of trafficking and coordinate the offering of direct assistance services to children in need' (ILO-IPEC 2010:1) .

VCs almost always include a traditional village leader, a religious figure, an influential local woman, a young person, and two or three other literate and respected individuals. Committee members are given child rights training, taught about the dangers of child trafficking, and encouraged to make plans of action for both raising local awareness against the danger of child migration and for preventing that migration, either directly or by alerting the authorities. *Payment is not offered for those who take part in the initiative, since it is understood that 'local ownership' is important.* In countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali, committees are often provided with a shared bicycle, a loud speaker and a raincoat to facilitate their patrols.

In the 10 years since their inception, VCs have been widely hailed as an excellent tool for preventing child trafficking and other, related abuses. UNICEF and a broad array of national ministries are on record as having offered such assessments. The ILO too have concurred, with a recent IPEC publication upholding them as an example of 'good practice':

'LVCs are an effective and appropriate structure to curb trafficking by working with the children most at risk of being trafficked and their families' (ibid.).

Evaluation reports and academic research strongly contradict this assessment, however. Professor Roger Botte is one of the world's leading scholars working on trafficking and slavery in Africa, as well as on efforts to combat them. In 2006, he conducted what remains to date the most detailed and extensive empirical investigation into the effectiveness of VCs as protection tools. In his analysis, conducted across three countries and over many months, despite the money spent establishing these committees, they are almost everywhere ineffective, since *they are top-down impositions which remain under-funded, overly focussed on migrant policing, insensitive to the reasons why people move, and thus largely ignored by their target populations* (2005:4-9).

This assessment has been confirmed by the present author's own empirical research into the working of VCs in Southern Benin (see Howard 2012, 2012a, 2013, 2013a). The research in question involved detailed observation and dozens of interviews with VC members and residents of the villages for which they were responsible. What transpired was that many villagers are unaware that the VCs even exist; while for others, they are merely a nuisance to be ignored or challenged. Even VC members see themselves them as ineffectual, as is clearly demonstrated by the interview in Box 1 below.

This data strongly point towards the need for better policy and project evaluation, of which it is no secret that there is a lack in Africa (Dottridge 2007:41). The data

also suggest that *there is a fundamental strategic problem with initiatives such as VCs, which devolve the cost of maintenance, first, onto under-resourced states, and second, onto local populations who are expected to take 'ownership' and thus work voluntarily.* Such a conclusion would indeed seem intuitive in contexts of national poverty and material deprivation. Unless that deprivation is tackled, and unless resources are provided to tackle it, then little is likely to change.

Box 1: Village Committee Interview

'Neil: Can you describe to me the work that the VC does?'

***Charley:** Each village quartier has a representative to watch over child departures. From time to time, we all get together to give each other an update. In the beginning, it worked well, but because it's voluntary work, and we haven't heard a thing since it was set up, our level of activity has significantly diminished...*

Neil: Does the state support your work? Or the donors?

***Charley:** No. They give us nothing. It's all voluntary so we don't have any means. Now, because kids are struggling, and [a local NGO] doesn't have the means to look after all of them, there is a risk of departure.*

Neil: What does the community think of you guys?

***Charley:** [He smiled knowingly here, almost as if to indicate their dislike]. Our role is not repression. We're just here to tell the authorities what's happening. Sometimes we're seen in a bad light though because of our relationship with the authorities. The problem is that sometimes we call the police and those guys do nothing. There is no enforcement, so kids still leave.*

Neil: Why don't the police react?

***Charley:** Because they have loads of other stuff to do and sometimes they don't even have a vehicle, since their one car may be in action elsewhere, meaning that they can't come to the village. When that happens, the quartier representative will say "don't let your child leave" and the family will tell him to mind his own business. They say "this is our child, we can do what we want with him, he is here doing nothing and we have no money"'.*

(Interview, 19/4/10)

- Problems With Targeting

As is always the case when implementing actors face serious budgetary constraints, the governments and their partner agencies involved in recent African anti-FL work have had to make extensive use of targeting in order to ensure their policy and project effectiveness. At times, this targeting has proved successful. At others, however, it most decidedly has not, with the evidence suggesting that this has been particularly the case when it comes to *awareness-raising* and *targeted poverty alleviation*.

Beginning with awareness-raising, then, ‘sensitisation’ and the attempt to change people’s behaviour or mentality has been one of the most widespread policy tools used in the fight against FL, both in Africa and elsewhere (ILO 2013:27). Almost every government, international agency and NGO has included an awareness-raising component in its recent African anti-FL work. A review of project plans and evaluation documentation shows that initiatives in Africa have included information caravans, roadside posters, radio programmes, songs, films and also school and NGO ‘outreach’ initiatives.

While some of these efforts have been well designed and effective in reaching many thousands of people, major problems exist when the messages used are either impractical, inaccurate or irrelevant. In this respect, it has been notable that for much of the past decade, one of the major anti- child trafficking messages to be heard in Africa has been ‘do not let your children migrate, because migration is dangerous, since it can lead to trafficking’ (Castle and Diarra 2003, Botte 2005, Thorsen 2007, Howard 2012, 2013a). In the present author’s own research in Benin, for instance, NGOs have been subcontracted to go into villages to tell people that if their children migrate they will end up in slavery, while myriad media activity has suggested the same (Howard 2013). Similar stories have also been found in Mali and Burkina Faso (Castle and Diarra 2003, Botte 2005, Dougnon 2011).

The issue with this kind of messaging is of course that it is false – and people know it. More often than not, as recent research has begun to demonstrate, people know what kinds of work awaits their children when they leave, because their children are migrating along well-worn paths and within well-established migrant networks that often include relatives or friends (Thorsen 2007, Morganti 2011, Alber 2011). As such, although *some* migrants certainly do end up in situations of trafficking, slavery, or other exploitation, the vast majority of people know that the vast majority of them do not.

The major consequence of this simplistic messaging is that people ignore the messages, and begin to distrust the veracity of the messenger. As an illustration of this, in one group interview conducted by the author in Benin among a community with strong links to Abeokuta’s small-scale gravel quarries, a respondent stated:

‘When we hear the “don’t move” message in school...we say “ok, we won’t leave”, but then we leave anyway because we need money and there isn’t any here’.

In another interview, a respected local figure raged in disgust at the ‘stupidity’ of those who tell his people not to move, ‘because they have never even been here to see how we live’. His relative then shouted: ‘Those who tell us not to move are the people who hold back the development of this village!! It is a terrible message! And they give us nothing in return’.

The problems facing targeted anti-poverty initiatives are often of a slightly different nature. There is no doubt that being poor contributes to socio-economic vulnerability and that it is the poorest people who find themselves most at risk of labour exploitation. This was demonstrated theoretically in Chapter 1 and empirically in Chapter 2. The logic of reducing poverty as part of attempts to protect against and prevent FL therefore stands up to scrutiny: if nobody is poor then nobody will have to accept awful working conditions, and no ‘economic coercion’ will be able to push people into FL.

In practice, however, targeted poverty-reduction often remains highly ineffective, with ‘a stubborn slew of empirical evidence’ suggesting that too often it fails to achieve its stated goals (Makandawire 2005:16). At times this failure is due to basic implementation complications, *but more often it is an inevitable result of the internal contradictions inherent to targeted poverty reduction strategies themselves*. Reviewing the global social and development policy shift from population-wide ‘universalism’ to ‘targeting’, the former Director of the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Thandika Mkandawire, explains that ‘under universalism, the entire population is the beneficiary of social benefits as a basic right, while under targeting, eligibility to social benefits involves some kind of means-testing to determine the “truly deserving”’ (ibid.1). He continues: ‘The formulation for the case for targeting goes something like this: In the face of limited fiscal resources, it is better to target the resources to the “deserving poor”’. Given tight budget constraints, actors including governments, NGOs and international organisations need therefore to ‘do their best under the circumstances’ (ibid.2-3).

The factors which undermine efforts to do the best under the circumstances are many and varied. On a technical level, given that targeting strategies always rely on some mechanism to distinguish between and separate who is poor and who is not poor, they always run the risk of error, with some people deserving benefits denied them (‘under-coverage’) and others who do not deserve them receiving them by mistake (‘leakage’). These errors can be attributed to any of the myriad dynamics plaguing the technicalities of implementation, ranging from insufficient capacity, to corruption, to local political demands and prerequisites, gender bias, patronage, and administrative wastage. Inevitably, mitigating these issues is itself a crippling impossibility – *since it involves high administrative costs and the administrative sophistication and capacity that frequently do not exist either in poor countries or in resource-constrained NGO and IO operations* (Srivastava 2004).

Beyond the fact that targeting may therefore be a ‘luxury’ that only the wealthy can afford to effectively employ (Makandawire 2005:11), there are a number of other targeting ‘paradoxes’ that reduce the effectiveness of targeting vis-à-vis universalist alternatives. First among these is that, where targeted poverty-

reduction represents the anti-poverty policy norm, *overall anti-poverty resources tend to be reduced*. What this means is that, given the assumption that targeting has taken care of the poor, political authorities tend to allow their tax-and-spend policies to become regressive, promoting further inequality at the expense of equity. Second, political support for welfare policies such as poverty-relief depends on their universality. In other words, at a national and a local level, non-poor ‘buy-in’ to redistributive policies that help the poor diminishes when those policies are targeted instead of forming part of universal schemes such as national healthcare. As Moene and Wallerstein conclude in their study on the issue, ‘the optimal policy for the very poor is not necessarily a policy that targets benefits as narrowly as possible’ (2001:22).

Consequently, it should come as no surprise that comparative and historical studies of poverty reduction conclude that the greatest success in tackling poverty has been achieved ‘not by explicitly addressing it but by addressing a whole range of issues that positively impacted on poverty or impeded the poor from bettering their situation – economic development in a broad sense, investment in human capital and equity were crucial to rapid eradication of poverty’ (Makandawire, 2005:8). It is possible to argue, therefore, that aside from mere technical failure, targeted anti-poverty strategies actually make things quixotically worse for the poor, by diverting attention away from alternative policies that would have more broad-based and sustainable effects in their favour.

Private Initiatives

The last section of this chapter will examine the private, business-focussed initiatives using ‘self-regulation’ as a tool to protect vulnerable workers and prevent extreme exploitation. Though these initiatives have been widely commended, they still face a number of challenges and contain a number of weaknesses. The latter part of the section will address those weaknesses which are internal to the self-regulation strategy. We will begin, however, with those which relate to their context – and which show that, ultimately, self-regulation alone is fundamentally insufficient, since it can only ever be truly effective *when accompanied by and existing within a robust legislative framework backed by consistent enforcement*.

- Insufficiency

Corporate social responsibility...cannot be a substitute for properly resourced and implemented statutory enforcement mechanisms.

ILO, Strengthening Action to End Forced Labour, 2013

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies and industry self-regulation initiatives do not exist in a vacuum. They are always and everywhere part of the regulatory framework that includes and is ultimately determined by national and international law. Over the past four decades, states have diminished the power of that regulatory framework, reducing investment in labour inspection, liberalizing labour laws, and promoting the devolved governance of corporate practice onto businesses themselves. As Professor Jennifer Clapp has observed:

'A key reason for the rise of private standards...is partly that states have stepped back from proactive regulatory roles, allowing and even fostering private sector bodies to take on regulatory activities' (2012:49).

Though many argue that this 'neoliberal' economic strategy promotes economic dynamism and global capitalist integration, by freeing businesses from the weight of external regulation, many others argue that it does so at the cost of worker protection. Indeed, it seems intuitive that leaving employee protection to employers alone is likely to remain insufficient. For although scrupulous employers may take their legal and moral obligations seriously, unscrupulous ones may not. And in the absence of stringent legislation and rigorous state enforcement to prevent them from abusing their workers, there is little to stop them from doing so³⁴. The major challenge, therefore, is:

'to find the appropriate balance between the voluntarism of most CSR approaches, with their emphasis on codes of conduct and self-regulation, and the clear legal obligation to prevent and eradicate forced labour in the private economy, an obligation that requires vigorous and effective monitoring' (ILO 2009:63).

Though we might assume that business leaders will oppose tighter legislation and tougher enforcement, not all do. Some have even called on states to remain the key players in forming and enforcing the legislative framework within which they operate and within which they can *compliment, rather than replace*, state regulation and oversight³⁵. The UNOCHCR-authored *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights* explain that:

'States should not assume that businesses invariably prefer, or benefit from, State inaction, and they should consider a smart mix of measures – national and international, mandatory and voluntary – to foster business respect for human rights...Guidance to business enterprises on respecting human rights should indicate expected outcomes and help share best practices' (2011:5).

One key example of why it makes sense for businesses to want both this guidance and the robust, well-enforced regulatory framework that underpins self-regulatory mechanisms, comes with the issue of corporate liability or criminal complicity. As the ILO have noted:

'Because forced labour is a serious crime, businesses have a legal obligation to prevent and eradicate it in their company operations, failing which they can be liable to criminal prosecutions and sanctions. But there are at least two outstanding issues of concern.

³⁴ <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/12/new-unicef-guidelines-children-will-fall-flat-withoutbacking-business>

³⁵ Engaging business: Addressing forced labour, Meeting sponsored by the US Council for International Business, the US Chamber of Commerce and the IOE in cooperation with the ILO, hosted by the Coca Cola Company, Atlanta, United States, 20 February 2008.

First, when modern supply chains are so complex, there is the question of how far a company's liability should extend. Second, when the jurisprudence on forced labour in the private economy is still so young, there are bound to be uncertainties and "grey areas" as to which business practices constitute the risk of forced labour' (2009:49).

This kind of uncertainty can represent a serious challenge to business. Businesses need to have clear lines drawn as to how far their 'human rights due diligence' has to go and as to how far their criminal liability will extend. In the absence of this certainty, they may unexpectedly find themselves facing costly criminal proceedings brought by employees or, more likely, human rights advocacy bodies, just as they may experience serious reputational damage should abusive employment practices for which they have responsibility be discovered³⁶.

- **Transfer of the Cost of Compliance**

This and the following sub-section will address the problems and insufficiencies which are inherent to self-regulation as a strategy. The first of these can be termed 'the transfer of the cost of compliance'. What is meant by this?

Professor Susanne Freidberg of Dartmouth College explains. In her research on initiatives such as Fairtrade or the ETI, Freidberg shows that standard-setting and price premiums can raise the prices received and labour standards enjoyed by primary producers in Africa. However, they do not do so un-problematically. This is because these higher prices and better labour standards come at a profit cost to Western retailers. But these retailers, by virtue of their huge size, their market domination and their price-setting power, are able to avoid absorbing those costs – *by transferring them on to the primary producers themselves.*

Freidberg illustrates this with an analysis of Kenyan horticultural suppliers selling to UK supermarkets. Alongside the ETI, the major UK supermarkets purchasing from Kenya belong to the European Retailer Fresh Produce Working Group, which has adopted a protocol of 'good agricultural practice' that aims to 'bring supermarkets' agricultural suppliers into compliance with standards covering not just worker welfare but also food safety, farm chemical use, natural resource conservation and wildlife protection' (2003:31). This has meant that supermarkets now demand that their suppliers produce organically, provide crèches for working parents', offer workers the latest protective clothing, and pay workers relatively high wages. The contradiction, however, is that:

'[S]tandards cost, and the retailers are not willing to pay. The costs of

³⁶ The crucial question which remains unresolved, however, is where exactly one draws the line regarding a businesses legal liabilities? Though, as the UNOCHCR notes, international jurisprudence indicates that the current standard for corporate complicity seems to be knowingly aiding or abetting the commission of a crime (2011:13), the legal scholar, Anita Ramasastry, argues that this should be extended to include *the indirect complicity* arising when a corporate actor benefits from rights violations which it knows have been committed by another party (2002:150). Such an extension would have serious implications for the protection of worker rights in countries like Eritrea, since it would compel the foreign companies working there to refuse to do business with rights-violating authorities, thus placing economic pressure on them to comply with international labour norms.

crèches and clinics and chemical storage facilities, of protective clothing and medical check-ups for all the pesticide sprayers, of the labour to keep records and monitor workers – all these are borne by the supermarkets' suppliers, meaning the [Kenyan] companies themselves...Most outgrowers support the idea of providing schools and other facilities for their workers, and generally agree with the supermarkets' standards for minimal pesticide use. But while they have invested in complying with these standards, the UK retailers have remained flat, leading to shrinking profit margins' (ibid.34).

The necessary consequence of this squeezing is that while labour standards may have been improved for a small number of workers, that gain has been offset by the fact that less workers are now being employed, as horticultural firms have had to 'rationalise' production. Additionally, this rationalisation has seen the nature of the firms supplying to UK supermarkets change. Where once export horticulture was a domestic cottage industry providing income for thousands of African peasant farmers, now supermarkets are relying more and more on larger-scale, often foreign-owned, mechanised operations, thus taking business from precisely the poor communities who would most likely benefit from it. Where market forces operate and large-scale businesses such as supermarkets are unprepared to forgo a slice of their profits to under-write better standards or higher primary prices, this seems likely to be inevitable. It thus represents a clear lacuna in self-regulatory endeavours.

- A Distraction From Political Economy

A final, related problem with consumer- or business-focussed self-regulatory strategies is their failure to address wider, and arguably more important, questions of political economy. This can again be illustrated by looking at commodity production, and in particular at the production of cocoa³⁷.

Cocoa is one of the world's most highly prized food crops. Two thirds of it is grown by farmers in West Africa, predominantly in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, where it is estimated that 90-95% of production takes place on small, family-run plantations of less than three hectares in size. The small size of plantations reflects both the history of cocoa as a peasant cash crop in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, and also the intricate labour and attention to detail that is necessary when growing the cocoa plant, which make it very difficult to grow on a large scale or using modern machinery.

Cocoa is the essential ingredient in chocolate, and thus represents the cornerstone of the global chocolate industry, which is worth an annual \$75bn to companies such as Cadbury and Hershey. Though the chocolate industry cannot exist in the absence of primary African cocoa production, *only 4% of the price of a chocolate bar finds its way down to the African cocoa farmer*. Indeed, in the UK, for every £1 spent on a bar of chocolate, only 7 pence goes on cocoa ingredients, while 43 pence goes to the multi-national chocolate manufacturers (Ryan 2011).

³⁷ The same argument can be and is often made with many other agricultural commodities, and cotton in particular. See <http://rightswork.org/2011/08/spinning-the-threads-of-poverty-cotton-subsidies-and-the-political-economy-of-trafficking-in-southern-benin/>

One of the reasons why cocoa farmers receive so little for their crop is that the chocolate companies who purchase the majority of it are themselves so large and so powerful that they are able to determine the price they are willing to pay, irrespective of the profits they subsequently make. The leading agricultural economist and food politics expert, Professor Jennifer Clapp, explains:

'Giant agrifood companies are able to shape the conditions under which they operate...through the use of their economic weight to pursue pricing strategies that affect the financial returns to others they deal with, including both their suppliers and competitors...The very largest firms with the most market share...have considerable buying power with suppliers, and thus can set the prices at which they are willing to purchase from suppliers. The reason is simple. The fewer buyers in the market, the more likely they are to work together to set the price. And when there is one dominant buyer that suppliers and producers must rely upon to sell their product, the easier it is for that one firm to be a price-setter for the goods it purchases' (2012:114-5).

A major consequence of this is that already poor cocoa producers find it extremely difficult to cover the costs of cocoa production. As a result, they almost always have to rely on unpaid, occasionally exploited, predominantly family labour. As the cocoa market specialist, Orla Ryan, explains:

'In this hand-to-mouth existence, family labour holds cocoa enterprises together. Without it, smallholders would struggle to harvest the crop. Most don't earn enough to hire other people to do it...One chief executive of a European cocoa company admitted: "The only way it works and something the chocolate manufacturers will never tell you ever – they do all know the truth, they just don't say it – [is that] if you didn't get families with free labour, it doesn't work"' (2011:60³⁸).

It is therefore particularly ironic that the major chocolate manufacturers have backed the ICI's misplaced drive to ban child and forced labour from cocoa production. Indeed, in doing so, and by focussing on changing farmer behaviour without helping farmers out of the economic insecurity and poverty that shapes their behaviour, they arguably put blame onto farmers when it lies with those who shape farmer lives. As such, while these initiatives offer companies the chance to market themselves as caring or responsible, they offer very little to the farmers upon whose labour these companies rely, while also *distracting attention* from the wider political economic conditions that are most urgently in need of change. Put simply, initiatives such as Fairtrade, ETI or ICI *are unlikely ever to be able to successfully tackle exploitative labour, or to improve workers' lives, since they fail to address the core economic underpinnings of poverty and exploitation* (Lerche 2007).

³⁸ The ILO's *Strengthening Action to End Forced Labour* report affirms this assessment, stating that 'causal factors [of FL] include: excessive pressure on employers to cut costs, especially in labour intensive industries, or unrealistic production deadlines or targets imposed by buyers' (2013:96).

CHAPTER 4

LESSONS LEARNED AND A WAY FORWARD

Introduction and Overview

The previous chapters of this report have offered a detailed overview of what we currently do and do not know about FL in Africa and of what is and is not happening in response. There is reason to be encouraged. Comprehensive quantitative estimates have been made, some good quality empirical data exists, and evidence has been generated around the ways in which people find themselves in and experience FL. Governments and civil society bodies appear to be engaged – and there is an apparent abundance of political will that can and must be capitalised on. National legal architectures are being strengthened; partnerships between countries, across continents, and among state and non-state actors are increasing; and large sums of money are being invested in raising awareness, changing business practices, and directly tackling instances of extreme coercion.

Drawbacks remain, however, and these are currently undermining the effectiveness of attempts to eradicate FL in Africa. First among these is the serious deficit in sufficient, nuanced understandings either of where and how much FL takes place, or of what causes it. In particular, the need to link ground-level instances of abuse with wider structural forces is urgent. Currently, we also lack detailed evaluations and impact studies as to the success or failure of many of the anti-FL strategies that have been put in place. Secondly, from the research that exists, we know that mainstream anti-FL strategies are found wanting in a number of ways. Implementation challenges linked to programme approaches – notably with the VCs – make their success a difficult prospect to imagine. Likewise, where policies have failed to tackle the structural underpinnings of FL or where they have focussed on business self-regulation instead of on the state and inter-state construction of an enforced legal framework for worker protection, insufficiencies and gaps will always exist.

Over this, the report's final chapter, we will build on the critical analysis offered above and provide a number of suggestions as to where we can go from here.

Recommendations

The Basics

First, the fundamentals. Almost no report on FL or its prevention goes by without mentioning a handful of the most basic measures that can and must be taken to improve anti-FL work. Most of these recommendations are intuitive, and given that they are so widely repeated, we will not dwell on them in detail here. They bear brief mention, however, since acting on them would undoubtedly improve Africa's fight against FL. These basic include:

- 1) *Ensuring that states put in place and respect the appropriate legal framework.* This includes not only ratifying all the relevant international conventions, but also implementing them, as well as extending legal coverage to vulnerable groups such as apprentices, sex workers and domestic workers, and improving labour migration governance. This latter element would involve measures to formalise recruitment agencies and intermediary services.
- 2) *Making sure that states and their partners direct sufficient resources to ensure effective legal enforcement.* In the many African countries which already have the right laws on the books, the resources necessary for effective implementation and competent policing are absent. This evidently needs to change, and that change will involve states directing more of their revenue to this kind of law enforcement, as well as donors and partners channelling more of their resources to support that effort.
- 3) *Bringing an end to civil conflict.* It is undeniable that conflict involves massive human rights abuses, including with regards to forced labour and sexual exploitation. The sooner actors involved in conflict in Africa are able to establish peace, the sooner vulnerable Africans will be free of conflict-induced exploitation.
- 4) *Strengthening a workers' stand against FL.* As has been noted elsewhere 'Trade unions are central partners in the fight against forced labour. ILO assistance for the activities of a global trade union alliance against forced labour and trafficking...has steadily raised awareness of forced labour and the role of trade unions in combating it. This work could increasingly cascade down to trade union activities...including legal advocacy, capacity-building activities, and support for designated trade union focal points with specific responsibility for forced labour and trafficking' (ILO SAP-FL, 2013:134). A good example of effective worker organizing in this regard concerns the case of Firestone employees in Liberia, who mobilized to secure an end to the employment of young children on company plantations³⁹.
- 5) *Improving victim support services.* This would involve initiatives such as providing shelters and trauma counselling for those who have been removed from situations of FL, offering reintegration packages that help individuals and communities, as well as providing witness protection services for those who might come forward against abusive employers.

Beyond these basics, there are three core recommendations that represent undoubted and immediate priorities for reinforcing the African fight against FL. Each of these will now be examined in greater detail, since they represent the overarching major shifts necessary.

³⁹ <http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ilab/ILAB20110176.htm>

Get Better Data - Quantitative and Qualitative

The starting point for reinforcing the African fight against FL is to generate and share as much better quality data as possible. Undoubtedly, this *data must be qualitative as well as quantitative*, since it is only through the detailed, ground-level work characteristic of academia that policy-makers will be able to avoid falling prey to the unsubstantiated, sensationalist reporting that diverts so much attention away from real, genuine cases of FL.

Similarly, if policy is to be as effective as possible in tackling genuine FL cases, it is going to need research *to elucidate which factors constitute the causes of FL*. These factors may be structural – related to global economic injustices – or social – related to more locally-grounded inequalities and discriminations.

The monitoring and evaluation of existing anti-FL efforts is also going to be crucial, and improving data quality will have to include *a massive increase in funding for the detailed examination and assessment of current strategies*. This is necessary both to find out what does and does not work, and also to avoid the negative ‘unexpected side-effects’ that can arise from un-examined policies (Dottridge 2007:41). As the *Strengthening* report states:

‘While most countries have undertaken some prevention initiatives, few of these initiatives have been subject to rigorous assessment and evaluation, meaning that the lessons of experience cannot be used to inform the design of future strategies’ (2013:95).

Urgent efforts are therefore needed to undertake ‘rigorous analysis of the strengths and weaknesses, costs and benefits of alternative policy choices’ (ILO 2009:74). One potential mechanism that could be employed to achieve this goal is the establishment of statutory reporting requirements at national and international level, for the gathering and dissemination of research and evaluation data to all relevant stakeholders. Such an initiative could be funded by coordinated IO or donor strategies, in light of how financially over-burdened low income states often are. A related contribution could be the requirement for IOs working on these issues to share their M&E reports and other publications with States and other public bodies engaged in anti-FL efforts.

Increase Labour Protection – Funding and Inspectorates

A second major step that African states and their partners must take in the fight against FL is to step beyond the reliance on light-touch regulation or self-regulation and *to invest heavily in the protection of fundamental labour and human rights by guaranteeing labour inspectorates the legal mandate and sufficient resources necessary to ensure that rights are respected* (Shamir 2012). As the ILO has observed:

‘All over the world, there has been huge investment in training police, border control and other law enforcement agencies... Yet the key role of labour inspectors, in the eradication and prevention of forced labour including human trafficking, has so far been overlooked...

States and other actors have tended to assume that forced labour and trafficking are best dealt with through criminal law enforcement and procedures, rather than through labour law, administration and justice' (in ILO SAP-FL 2008:v)⁴⁰.

This has been short-sighted, since well-resourced labour inspectorates are especially well placed to fight against FL, both in the formal and the informal economies. This is due to the unique blend of methods that labour inspectorates have at their disposal. For instance, they are free to enter any workplace liable to inspection without prior notice (as per Convention no.81). They are also entitled to carry out their enquiries unhindered, to examine documentation, and to speak with workers alone and away from their supervisors. Finally, they are required to investigate any labour complaint without revealing the details of the complainant, thus encouraging exploited workers to come forward (ILO SAP-FL 2008:20).

Two major limitations need to be overcome in order for labour inspectorates to play this potentially decisive role. The first is the diminished legal mandate that most have been reduced to after years of labour market deregulation. Broadening the legal reach of labour inspectors is therefore going to be a crucial step for states to take – *inspectors need to be entitled and required to engage all areas of the economy, including the informal*. The second limitation relates to the resources available for them to do so. As has been noted: ‘In developing countries, under-resourced labour inspectorates are usually too overstretched to regulate enterprises effectively even in the formal economy, let alone informal enterprises, private homes and worksites in remote locations where forced labour practices are most prevalent’ (ILO 2009:44). *A massive re-channelling of resources is therefore going to be necessary, with donors in particular helping poor states to expand their enforcement capacities*. Below is a good practice example of the ingenious ways in which well-resourced labour inspectorates can function in poor and often geographically large states such as those that characterise much of Africa.

⁴⁰ Even during the drafting of this report, the extent to which labour inspectorates are overlooked became apparent. One global child labour specialist suggested that labour inspectorates were unlikely to be useful when addressing informal economy exploitation, disregarding the fact that it is states themselves that establish the ability of labour inspectorates to penetrate and police the informal economy.

Box 3: Labour Inspectorates at Work

Mobile inspection unit, Brazil

One of the measures to combat forced labour in Brazil has been the creation of a Special Mobile Inspection Unit (Ordinance No. 550 MTb of 14 June 1995); a flying squad of labour inspectors and federal police officers. Both are drawn from a body of volunteers, none of whom operate in their federal state of residence for reasons of personal safety and independence from local pressures. Their job is to investigate allegations of forced labour on "fazendas" (rural farm estates or ranches). Sometimes labour judges are also part of the unit so that prosecution can be done swiftly and on the spot.

Regular evaluations of the operations of this Unit have pointed to two main criteria for effectiveness: centralized organisation and absolute secrecy in planning. Attempts to decentralize activities have proved unsuccessful in that news of inspection raids has invariably reached landowners in advance, enabling them to disperse workers or to cover up the situation.

The low-budget inter-agency team has proven crucial in the fight against forced labour. The investigative work of the mobile inspection teams has been replicated at the local and state level. The municipality of Vila Rica, in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, set up a commission with the participation of the Mayor's office and municipal council, and the agriculture producers' and rural workers' organisations. Upon receiving allegations of forced labour, the commission negotiated with local landowners and intermediaries. The very threat of calling in the Mobile Inspection Unit, and the prospect of fines, has facilitated negotiations. The Mobile Inspection Unit has only been brought in if such negotiations have broken down.

Source: ILO: Trabalho Escravo no Brasil do Século XXI, Brasil 2005

(Extracted from the ILO *Handbook for Labour Inspectorates*)

Advocacy – Bringing the Politics Back In

Our third and final recommendation here is also the most overarching. In a sense, it draws together the debates and observations that have run throughout this report. It suggests that, in order to truly overcome FL in Africa, what we need is a collective effort towards establishing a fundamental political-economic paradigm shift. For too long, FL has been treated in a technical manner and as a problem of criminality. This is reductive. *Because FL, like any other form of labour exploitation, is fundamentally a political phenomenon.*

The fact that workers are exploited, or that they are so poor and lacking in social protection that they have to accept dreadful working conditions as a condition for survival or economic advancement is not, as Steinfeld argues, an artefact of nature. It is, and always has been, a result of political decisions that structure the lives that people can and do lead. How we define freedom and coercion, for example, is a question of convention – conventions over how we distribute resources in society and over what vulnerabilities society is prepared to tolerate as acceptable for its poorest.

Similarly, with regards to anti-FL strategies, the policy choices available to us are themselves fundamentally politically determined. The recent reliance on business self-regulation, the predilection for targeted poverty reduction or community self-policing, and the absence of stringent labour rights enforcement are all the consequence of political choices to reduce the size of the state, to 'free' business

from regulation, and to diminish the state's redistributive role. The fact that some states therefore face fiscal constraints is not an exogenous phenomenon; it is a consequence of the tax burden they have chosen (not) to place on their wealthiest segments, just as, in the case of relatively poor African countries, it is a consequence of the choices made by wealthy countries over how much of their own budgets they dedicate towards supporting their African counterparts, over how much freedom they allow their corporations when they do business in Africa, and over how fair they allow the terms of trade to be.

Seen in this way, when asking ourselves how best to protect against FL, we are really asking ourselves what kind of national and global societies we wish to live in (Dowling 2004:201; see also Lerche 2008, Graeber 2009). Do we wish to live in a world where some people are left unprotected against the brute force of economic compulsion? Or do we wish to live in a world where social protection is sufficiently widespread that people are 'free' not to choose the least worst employment option? Do we wish to live in a world where peasant farmers are policed for underpaying or coercing their workers, while multi-billion dollar corporations drive the price those farmers receive for their crops down to below the level of subsistence? Or do we prefer a world in which states, rich and poor, use their legitimate authority to more effectively redistribute the wealth that has been collectively generated?

These questions have barely been asked in recent decades, and when they have been, they have been derided as 'idealistic' or 'radical' (Fisher 2009). But there is nothing radical about wishing for all people to lead lives of dignity. Indeed, the ILO's own *Declaration of Philadelphia* puts this goal at its very heart. Nor is there anything radical about wishing a policy to achieve its basic goals. And, as the evidence suggests, FL exists in part because resources are so unevenly distributed, just as anti-FL policies fail for precisely the same reason.

In reflecting on where we go from here, then, the immediate answer is that we must re-open the debate over which kinds of societies we wish to live in. Once that debate has been re-opened, governments and organizations committed to eradicating FL must advocate for *a fairer political-economic future, one that involves a greater redistribution of existing resources, and that tackles the political root cause of exploitation*. The ILO is uniquely well-placed to lead this effort, given its tripartite structure and its unrivalled history of successful mobilization and public opinion-forming⁴¹. Those NGOs and IOs sharing the ILO's ideals, and those African governments themselves struggling on the 'underside of globalization', would do well to join forces and unite with the ILO in this push. The Decent Work Agenda is a step in the right direction. But if that can be coupled with systematic analysis, bravery in advocacy, and multi-stakeholder advocacy partnerships between all those genuinely concerned to eradicate FL, then FL in Africa may well one day become a thing of the past.

⁴¹ As the *Cost of Coercion* report notes, the ILO has a powerful history in this regard. The 2005 FL estimate, for instance, 'continues to be widely cited, and has served to focus minds at all levels on the need for action. Global press coverage of forced labour-related stories has increased more than three-fold between 2004 and the end of 2007.' Similarly, after the ILO's website on forced labour was launched in May 2007, the number of external visitors had increased tenfold by late 2008' (2009:66). Maupin 2005 and Deakin 2005 offer further important examples here.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TYPOLOGIES OF FORCED LABOUR IN AFRICA

Mike Dottridge has provided a detailed overview of the kinds of coercion that research suggests lead to FL in Africa, as well as of the ways in which people enter FL situations on the continent. The following two tables summarise this analysis:

Table 1. Types of coercion used to make people work for others

1. Threats or actual acts of violence, including abduction, corporal punishment, rape and instilling the fear that an individual refusing to obey orders might be killed, maimed, beaten or injured.
2. Threats of retaliation of a political nature, in a situation in which the individual requiring another to work is in a position of power, such as a traditional monarch or village chief, and can potentially take retaliatory action of various sorts or influence others to do so. Such methods may be used both by legitimate authorities, whether traditional or linked to the State, and by the unofficial militias which operate with the tacit support of government officials in some countries. There are also cases involving armed groups of opposition militias.
3. Threats (explicit or implied) of supernatural retaliation against an individual while he or she is living or after their death.
4. Economic coercion imposed via a loan and consequent debt (debt bondage and pawning), in which the indebted person is led to believe that retaliation will occur if they (or their relative) fail to work off a debt and the exorbitant interest linked to it. The retaliation may be as simple as refusing to give a further loan.
5. Holding on to a worker's passport or other official identity documents, usually when the worker concerned is outside his or her country of origin and fears arrest or other significant problems if found not to be in possession of these documents.
6. Social or economic sanctions such as a 'social boycott' - retaliatory action taken by both the individual requiring another to work for him and by other members of the same social group, such as refusing to employ someone, or to give them access to land, or other means of production or income-generation.
7. Invoking the authority of State officials to keep people in their current predicament (for example, when employers of forced labour seek the support of local government or law enforcement officials in persuading workers not to leave).
8. Geographic isolation that makes it difficult to escape or otherwise leave, often associated with an apparent absence of alternative ways of generating an income, at least in the same locality.

9. Invoking kinship relations, notably implying that someone is giving unremunerated labour because they are ‘one of the family’ or a member of the household.

Table 2. Ways in which people enter a situation of forced labour

1. Birth/descent	The person concerned is born into some form of servile status, sometimes meaning they may subsequently be transferred without their consent (or that of their parents) from one household to another (“being given away”).
2. Abduction	This occurs particularly in situations of political conflict and violence, but also in peaceful situations in which there is perceived to be a ‘market’ for children or adults who have been abducted. In some cases children have been abducted for the purpose of an (illegal) inter-country adoption. To complicate matters, abduction is still a socially accepted way of acquiring wives in some regions.
3. Sale	It is rare today to hear of human beings being ‘sold’, except in the case of women who have been trafficked and are sold (sometimes auctioned) before reaching their final destination. However, cases of illicit inter-country adoption of African children are reported to have involved either parents or agents in control of young children, taking money in exchange for a child.
4. Marriage	Notably in certain cases of polygamous marriage, where a primary reason for getting married is to acquire control over a woman’s labour.
5. Debt	Taking an advance in cash or kind and incurring a debt, commonly to finance migration, which has to be worked off by the person or by a relative (traditionally often referred to as a ‘pawn’), i.e. debt bondage.
6. Receiving orders from individuals in authority or able to use violence	When a person fears to disobey others in authority or those perceived to wield political influence or able to mobilise political violence (through possession of guns or other weapons), whether or not those exercising authority are doing so on behalf of the State.
7. Imprisonment	Prisoners convicted for either criminal or political reasons are required to work for a private individual, such as a prison guard, or enterprise, or untried prisoners are required to perform forced labour

8. Deception (of migrants or child migrants' parents)	Parents are deceived by an intermediary who recruits their children and promises them a brighter future or to send their earnings back to their parents, and who fails to deliver on these promises.
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Tables Extracted from Dottridge 2005, pp. 691-5.

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APPENDIX B: COUNTRIES SAID TO BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY FORCED LABOUR IN AFRICA

Countries on the US TIP Tier 2 Watchlist and Tier 3:

ALGERIA (Tier 3)
ANGOLA (Tier 2 Watch List)
BURUNDI (Tier 2 Watch List)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (Tier 3)
CHAD (Tier 2 Watch List)
COMOROS (Tier 2 Watch List)
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE (Tier 3)
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Tier 2 Watch List)
EQUATORIAL GUINEA (Tier 3)
ERITREA (Tier 3)
THE GAMBIA (Tier 2 Watch List)
GUINEA-BISSAU (Tier 2 Watch List)
KENYA (Tier 2 Watch List)
LIBERIA (Tier 2 Watch List)
LIBYA (Tier 3)
MADAGASCAR (Tier 3)
MALAWI (Tier 2 Watch List)
MAURITANIA (Tier 2 Watch List)
NAMIBIA (Tier 2 Watch List)
NIGER (Tier 2 Watch List)
SENEGAL (Tier 2 Watch List)
SEYCHELLES (Tier 2 Watch List)
SIERRA LEONE (Tier 2 Watch List)
SOUTH SUDAN (Tier 2 Watch List)
SUDAN (Tier 3)
ZIMBABWE (Tier 3)
SOMALIA (Special Case)

Other Countries Reviewed by the ILO Committee of Experts

UGANDA
MOZAMBIQUE
RWANDA
BENIN
MALI
MOROCCO
ETHIOPIA
LESOTHO
TANZANIA
MAURITIUS
EGYPT
IVORY COAST
GHANA

APPENDIX C: EXAMPLES OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FORCED LABOUR IN AFRICA

Donors and Non-African Government Agencies

AFD
DANIDA
DFID
USDOL
USTIP
Swiss Aid

International Organisations

ILO
IOM
UNICEF
UNODC

International NGOs

BORNE-FONDEN
CAFOD
Christian Aid
Save the Children
World Vision

African NGOs

Action for Peace and Development
Activists Networking against the Exploitation of Children
Abuja Children and Youth International Association of Nigeria
Africa Youth Growth Foundation
African Centre for Advocacy and Human Development
African Foundation For Human Advancement
African Tourism and Development Organization
African Youths Initiatives on Crime Prevention
Africans United Against Child Abuse (AFRUCA).
Aid the Children Network
Amazing Grace Children Centre
Asabe Shehu Yar'adua Foundation
Association of African Women for Research and Development
Association Amis Juristes de Djibouti
Association Africaine de Défense des Droits de l'Homme
Association Carre Geo & Environnement
Association Des Femmes Chrétiennes d'Aide et de Développement
Association for consultation movement and environnement evaluation
Association pour la Promotion de la Lutte Contre les Violences faites aux femmes
Busia Compassionate Friends
Campaign For Child Rights

Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance
 Central African Inter-NGO Council - Conseil Inter-ONG en Centrafrique
 Centre for Child Protection and Rescue
 Challenging Heights
 Children in Need Network
 Child Protection Alliance
 Committee for the Support of the Dignity of Women
 DITSHWANELO - The Botswana Centre for Human Rights
 Droits Humains Sans Frontières
 Edo State NGO Coalition Against Trafficking in Persons
 Egyptian Trade Union Federation
 Enfants Solidaires d'Afrique et du Monde
 Eye of the Child
 Federation of Environmental and Ecological Diversity for Agricultural
 Revampment and Human Rights
 Feed the Children
 Foundation Humanus / Humanus International
 Free State Network on Violence Against Women
 Friends of Suffering Humanity
 Ghana NGO Coalition on the Rights of the Child
 Girls Power Initiative
 Global Aid and Development Foundation
 Global Safety and Relief Foundation
 Grassroots Development and Empowerment Foundation
 HO Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission
 Human Rights Information Network
 Human Rights Defenders Solidarity Network - Uganda
 Humanity Development
 Idia Renaissance
 Ikhwezi Women's Support centre
 Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
 International Association of Criminal Justice Practitioners
 International Human Rights & Anti-Corruption Society
 Justice And Peace Commission
 Laboratoire Anticorruption, Anti-Antivaleurs et Anti-fraude
 L'Association pour le Progres et la Defense des Droits des Femmes
 Lesotho Council of NGOs
 Mercy House
 Nan Hua Temple
 Network for Justice and Democracy
 Nigeria-Togo Association
 On Eagle's Wings
 Pan African Women's Organization
 Project Gateway
 Quaker Peace Centre
 Refugee Consortium of Kenya
 Research and Training For Real Empowerment
 Société d'Appui à la Mise en Œuvre du Droit International
 SOS Violences Sexuelles
 Southern African Anti Human Trafficking Trust

Temidayo Ogan Child Safety and Support Foundation
The Foundation for Human Rights and Development
The International Center for Street Children and Child Trafficking
Think Youth Independent Association
Tour Operation et Initiatives
Usindiso Ministries
Voice of Change International
Women and Children Support Initiative
Women Protection Organization
Women's Aid Organisation - Action to Stop Child Exploitation
WAO – Afrique
Women's Consortium of Nigeria
Women's Initiative for Self-Actualization
World Voices Sierra Leone
WOTCLEF
Young Businessmen Association for Community Development
Youth and Community Alive Initiative
Youth Crime Watch of Nigeria
Youth Crime Watch of the Gambia
Youth Crime Watch Sierra Leone
Youth Net and Counselling

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